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International Law and Control of the Media:
Terror, Repression and the Alternatives
JORDAN J. PAUST*
Things fall apart; the centre cannot hold,
Mere anarchy is loosed upon the world,
The blood-dimmed tide is loosed, and everywhere
The ceremony of innocence is drowned;
The best lack all conviction, while the worst
Are full of passionate intensity.
(W.B. Yeats)**
INTRODUCTION
It "damn nearly destroyed us" between the wars, Kenneth Clark wrote in
his work Civilisation; "it is lack of confidence, more than anything else, that
kills a civilisation."' These are prophetic remarks, if shifted to our focus in
the late 1970's. The threats posed by private and governmental strategies of
terror as well as the responding measures of governments in the name of anti-
terror or "national security" demonstrate an obvious danger to civilization as
it is known in the United States.
The human rights of our world citizenry are, very often, literally under
"a state of siege" or at a minimum ignored by power elites as well as their
enemies. "Innocence" is of course, a relative concept; but far too many are
killed, injured or imprisoned-all without a fair trial of their relative
"guilt"-by terrorists and anti-terrorists. Indeed, an alarming laxity of any
distinction and a blurring of even feigned categories is on the increase. As
Yeats might aver, the ceremonial adequacy of norms that prohibit murder,
assault, detention, torture and kidnapping of the innocents, not to mention
their rights to freedom of speech and association, is too often drowned in an
idealogic and political clash. 2 A recent newsclipping reflects merely one in-
stance: "Downtown Beirut degenerated into anarcy with street slayings, curb-
*A.B. 1965, J.D. 1968, U.C.L.A.; LL.M. 1972, University of Virginia; J.S.D. Candidate,
Yale University. Associate Professor of Law, University of Houston.
**THE SECOND COMING (1924). Instead of Christ, Yeats had in mind the Russian Revolu-
tion and, later, Italian Fascism. See MACK, KNox, MCGALLARD, PASINETrI, HUGO, WELLEK,
DOUGLAS, II WORLD MASTERPIECES 1488 (3rd. ed. 1973). In a sense he was correct in equating
leftist and rightist extremes. I disagree, however, that "the best lack all conviction."
1K. CLARK, CIVILISATION 347 (1969).
2See also Paust, Protection of Non-Protected Persons or Things, LEGAL RESPONSES TO IN-
TERNATIONAL TERRORISM (A.S.I.L. 1978), forthcoming; and Paust, Terrorism and the Interna-
tional Law of War, 64 MIL. L. Ray. 1 (1974), reprinted in 14 REv. DE DROIT PENAL MIL. Er DE.
DROIT DE LA GuERRE at 13 (Brussels 1975).
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side executions and kidnappings commonplace. At least 50 persons were kill-
ed and more than 100 wounded .over the past 24 hours . . ."3
There is moreover, an alarming increase among state elites and counter
groups of anti-democratic and anti-individual or machine-oriented thinking,4
a thinking which lessens the value and dignity of individual human beings as
well as the politico-legal need for humanistic distinction between targets.
When Yassir Arafat blurs the distinction between children and military com-
batants with an arrogant, blatantly obscurant remark that targeting inside
Israel involves "military operations, not terrorism-we are doing our best not
to harm civilians," 5 he mirrors an attitude expressed by Lieutenant Calley at
his court-martial, that he killed women, children and babies to defend his
men and his country, or by former President Nixon that his lists of "enemies"
and concomitant illegalities were needed to defend the office of the Presiden-
cy and a democratic society. s Nixon later added that the President is like a
"sovereign" and can ignore constitutional prohibitions and federal law to pro-
tect "national security."7
Nixon was wrong. The case law is fairly clear that the President, as any
governmental official, must obey the law,8 and that in the United States the
people alone are sovereign.9 A governmental dictatorship has not yet been
SHouston Post, May 22, 1976, at 15, col. 3 (UPI). Barely more "selective" are the murders
in Argentina, see, e.g., N.Y. Times, March 22, 1976, at 6, col. 1; id. Aug. 21, 1976, at 1, col.
1; id. June 7, 1976, at 3, col. 1. In Ethiopia, killing is claimed to be "a revolutionary act in itself
... a way of expressing it [revolution], of proving that it is still going on." N.Y. Times, Feb. 1.,
1978, at 3. col. 4.
4See H. MARCUSE. SOvIET-MARXIsM: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS (1961); N.Y. Times, Oct. 13,
1974, at 34, col. 1; id. Oct. 3, 1974, at 2, col. 4; id. Sept. 27, 1974, at 1, col. 6; id. Sept. 15,
1974, Sec. 4, at 4, col. 3. In times of perceived crisis these approaches are furthered. See also
McDougal, Lasswell & Chen, Non-Conforming Political Opinion and Human Rights: Transna-
tional Protection Against Discrimination, 2 YALE STUDIES IN WORLD PUB. ORDER 1 (1975); T.
GURR. WHY MEN REBEL (1970); H. ARENDT. TOTALITARIAMISM (1968); C. FRIEDRICH. Z. BRZEZIN-
SKI, TOTALITARIAN DICTATORSHIP AND AUTOCRACY (1961); H. LASSWELL, NATIONAL SECURITY AND
INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM (1950); warning of a withholding of information and an undermining of the
press.
sHouston Post, Feb. 9, 1976, at 8 D, col. 1 (UPI report of Arafat's interview on NBC's
Meet the Press); contra N.Y. Times, June 5, 1975, at 3, col. 6 (Arafat praises explosion in
Jerusalem's main square killing 13 and wounding 72.) See also N.Y. Times, March 12,
1978, at 2, col.6 (Fatah admits seizing busload of 60 civilians, half of whom were children-S0
dead, 80 wounded; N.Y. Times, March 14, 1978, at 17, col. 1; N.Y. Times, April 20, 1974, at
13, col. 5 (tourists are enemies); and N.Y. Times, Nov. 20, 1974, at 1, col. 2 (PDELP "military"
action).
6See Paust, Human Rights and the Ninth Amendment: A New Form of Guarantee, 60
CORNELL L. REV. 231, 242-43 (1975).
7See Houston Post, March 12, 1976, at 1, col. 6 (UPI).
8See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974); Youngstown Sheet and Tube v. Sawyer,
343 U.S. 579 (1952); Sterling v. Constantin, 287 U.S. 378 (1932); 287 U.S. 378 (1932); U.S. v.
Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 219-20 (1882); Brown v. U.S., 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 110 (1814); Marbury v.
Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 162-63 (1803); U.S. v. Toscanino, 50 F.2d 267 (2d Cir. 1974).
See also U.S. CONST., art. II, § 3 (oath to faithfully excute the laws); Kendall v. U.S., 37 U.S.
(12 Pet.) 524 (1838).
9See preamble, U.S. Constitution; Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253, 257 (1967) (Black, J.);
McCullouch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 316, 403-05 (1819) (Marshall, C.J.); and Paust,
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willingly accepted, but Nixon very nearly destroyed democracy in the name of
"national security." It would be foolish to allow governmental officials to
bring the United States closer to such destruction in the name of anti-terror,
especially if terrorism in this country poses far less danger to lives and well-
being than drunken or reckless driving, industrial accidents and industrial
pollution.
Nevertheless, writers in this symposium and others address the question
whether there should be restraints upon freedoms of speech and publication,
including controls of the media, because of certain threats posed by those
who would use the strategy of terrorism. This discussion might deal both with
"outsiders" who utilize terrorism to facilitate change and "insiders" who seek
to use terrorist tactics (repression) to maintain the status quo. Some, in-
cluding Ambassador Andrew Young, have even suggested that new federal
laws or new Supreme Court interpretations of the first amendment should
restrict press coverage of terrorist incidents.' 0 What seems to worry Am-
bassador Young and others are the mirror-effects of publicity for private ter-
rorist kidnappings and hijackings, the "glorification" of such events, the crea-
tion of anti-hero recognition through publicity, and the use of the media by
the terrorists to further propagandize their deeds." These are important con-
cerns, but far more important are the needs in a democracy for a relatively
free press and, as Kenneth Clark reminds, the maintenance of a minimal
level of confidence.' 2
So far, President Carter has refused to circumvent human and constitu-
tional rights to free speech and press. Instead, he seeks "discussion and sober
consideration" by the news media of "the definable boundaries of legitimate
coverage" of terrorist incidents and "has no desire to seek legislation or to
otherwise impose a solution.""s In the following pages one can discover the in-
ternational legal norms that are relevant to such a discussion and considera-
tion. An additional section of this article offers a survey of overly broad
and/or internationally impermissible approaches to control of the media in
the name of anti-terror and national security. Such are useful to keep in
mind when considering how they have developed, how they have been utilized
and how far restraints on media responses to terrorism can be tolerated
without a loss of democratic freedoms. Indeed, in a world that increasingly
reeks of dictatorship and tight, sometimes brutal, controls over people who
supra note 6, at 241-44 and 252. See also Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1957) (Black, J.);
Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (5 Dall.) 386, 388 (1798); Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 198, 199
(1796) (Chase, J.); E. CORWIN, LIBERTY AGAINST GOVERNMENT (1948).
1"See N.Y. Times, March 15, 1977, at 16, cal. 4; id. at 34, cal. 1 (editorial).
"See id. See also Reston, Terrorists and the Press, N.Y. Times, March 11, 1977, at 27, cal.
5. The fact that someone "uses" a relatively free press should hardly concern people like Young
or Reston. See also N.Y. Times, March 15, 1977, at 34, cal. 1 (editorial).
12See note 1 supra & text accompanying.




seek to receive and impart information we must be mindful of the global
threats to our own democracy and to fundamental human rights if we are to
assess more realistically the competing legal policies at stake, relevant trends
in decision, contextual conditions, projected future needs and events, and the
alternatives for policy-serving decision.14
Following a discussion of the relevant international legal policies at stake
and trends in state control and repression of freedoms of speech and press,
there is an exploration of viable alternatives to governmental control. Within
this final section one can identify the various suggestions made by other
writers to date, the ways in which international legal standards are integrated
into domestic law, and the suggestions of the author that our primary effort
should not be to control the media but to foster media awareness of the
various problems posed by terrorism and a code of ethics or guidelines for
free but responsible reporting of terrorist incidents, background, demands,
governmental responses, and so forth.
For the author, it is inconceivable that the United States would adopt the
broad legislative or executive approaches of other states which regulate any
support of or sympathy with terrorists and their aims, any criticism of the
government or governmental responsive measures, and any "false" presenta-
tion of fact or "distortion" of news. Further, it is inconceivable that such
measures could withstand the international human rights test of necessity
within democratic limits or the challenge likely to occur under the first
amendment to the United States Constitution.15 The media can play useful
roles in response to terrorism, however, and the media and government have
already shown that cooperative approaches can be creative and highly suc-
cessful. 16 Instead of media control, the focus should be upon cooperative ap-
proaches in response to terrorism. Additionally, United States foreign policy
should include a constant, affirmative striving to ensure respect for the fun-
damental human rights of freedom of speech and press and to oppose the
denial of such rights by oppressive governments.11
GENERAL INTERNATIONAL LEGAL POLICIES AT STAKE
There are several competing international legal policies at stake in most
cases of state claims to control the media. One relevant set of very broadly
phrased policies is contained in the United Nations Charter. Charter norms
14See also McDougal, Lasswell, Reisman, Theories About International Law: Prologue to a
Configurative Jurisprudence, 8 VA. J. INTL L. 188 (1968).
'
5 Concerning the U.S. Constitutional Challenge, see Paust, Response to Terrorism: A Pro-
logue to Decision Concerning Private Measures of Sanction, 12 STANFORn J. INTL STUDIES 79,
97-98 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Response to Terrorism], citing New York Times v. United
States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971), and other cases.
6See generally, Patience Key to Method in Handling Terrorists, Houston Post, Jan. 18,
1976, at 4B, col. 5; N.Y. Times, Dec. 25, 1975, at 1, col. 5.
'
7 See also 22 U.S.C. § 2304 (Supp. V. 1975).
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which might be relevant in any given case are: (a) the principle of equal
rights and self-determination of peoples'8 ; (b) the duty of all states to take
joint and separate action to achieve "universal respect for, and observance of,
human rights and fundamental freedoms for all,"' 9 and (c) the prohibition of
the threat or use of force by a state in any manner inconsistent with the pur-
poses of the United Nations. 20 Further, article 2, paragraph 7 of the Charter
generlly prohibits intervention of the United Nations and foreign states into
"matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction" of a state. 2
This provision has potential application to a claim by one state to prohibit
news or other coverage by international media or the media of another state
of terrorist "matters" that are "essentially within" the domestic concern of the
state in which the relevant events take place. 22
Interrelated with these norms, especially the obligation to take action for
the achievement of a universal implementation of human rights and fun-
damental freedoms, are other treaty and United Nations General Assembly
formulations of a more specific human rights content. 23 Also relevant in cer-
tain parts of the globe are the regional treaties on human rights which define
or supplement content for signators and set up implementary mechanisms in-
cluding individual petition procedures and regional courts. 24 Because the
regional conventions apply to "everyone" or "all persons" within the jurisdic-
"U.N. CHARTER, art. 1, 2.
"Id. Preamble, art. 1, 3; art. 55, c; art. 56.
20Id. art. II, 4.
"The language is conslusionary, for what becomes a matter of international concern is no
longer a matter "essentially" within the "domestic" jurisdiction of a state. See, e.g., McDougal &
Reisman, Rhodesia and the United Nations: The Lawfulness of International Concern, 62 Am. J.
INr'L L. 1 (1968). See also Article 19, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, note 23 infra
("regardless of frontiers"); I. OPPENREIM, INTERNATIONAL LAw 740 (8th ed. 1955).
22See infra notes 132-33 (claim by the U.S.S.R.). It is possible that other provisions of the
U.N. Charter will apply to future efforts to control the media, but the norms recognized in ar-
ticles 1, 2, 55, and 56 will be relevant in most cases.
"
5The most widely recognized documentation of rights content today is the 1948 Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, U.N.G.A. Res. 217A, 3 GAOR, U.N. Doc. A/810, at 71 (1948)
[hereinafter cited as the Universal Declaration]. For discussion of the legal effect of the Declara-
tion and utility for authoritative interpretation of the U.N. Charter, see, e.g., Sohn, The Human
Rights Law of the Charter, 12 TEx. INT'L L.J. 129, 133-34 (1977); J. CAREY, U.N. PROTECTION
OF CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS 9-16, 177-87 (1970); Sohn, The Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, 8 J. INT'L COMM. JUR. 17 (No. 2, Dec. 1967); McDougal & Bebr, Human Rights in the
United Nations, 58 Am. J. IN'rL L. 603, 637-40 (1964). See also Paust, infra note 25; Nanda, in-
fra note 241, at 35-36; McDougal, Lasswell & Chen, Human Rights and World Public Order, 63
AM. J. INTL L. 237 (1969). More recently, the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights has come into prominence as treaty law, binding upon a growing number of signators.
- U.N.T.S. _; approved by U.N.G.A. Res. 2200A, 21 U.N. GAOR, Supp. 16, at 52,
U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966). The U.S. signed this treaty Oct. 5, 1977. See N.Y. Times, Oct. 6,
1977, at 2, col. 5; 77 DEPr. STATE BULL. 578 (Oct. 24, 1977).
24The most notable regional treaties of this sort are the 1950 European Convention on
Human Rights, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 (1950), and the 1969 American Convention on Human Rights,
reprinted in 65 Am. J. INT'L L. at 679 (1971) (not yet in force). The U.S. signed the American
Convention, June 1, 1977. See 77 DEPT. STATE BULL. 28 (July 4, 1977).
1978]
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tion of a signator, they are also potentially applicable to any United States
journalist, tourist or other person traveling abroad. 2
Specific human rights norms contained in these documents demonstrate a
pervasive formal expectation that all human beings have the right to freedom
of opinion and expression. The 1948 Universal Declaration of Human
Rights2 6 sets forth several relevant normative expectations, 27 but those most
directly relevant to media access to information and individual access to the
media are contained in Article 19 of the Declaration, which reads:
Everyone has the right to freedom to opinion and expression; this right in-
cludes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and
impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of
frontiers.2 8
In contrast to its expressions of freedom or right is another article of the
Universal Declaration which conditions these freedoms and rights or makes
them relative. Article 29, paragraph 2, sets forth the types of social or
governmental interests that may, in appropriate circumstances, obviate or
condition, for example, the right to freedom of opinion and expression. It
states:
In the exercise of his rights and freedoms, everyone shall be subject to
such limitations as are determined by law solely for the purpose of securing
due recognition and respect for the rights and freedoms of others and of
meeting the just requirements of morality, public order and the general
welfare in a democratic society.
"See art. 1 of each convention, supra note 24. Thus, U.S. journalists can pursue regional
remedies under these conventions even though the U.S. is not a party to them. See also Paust,
Human Rights, Human Relations and Overseas Command, 3 ARMY LAw. 1 (Jan. 1973).
"See note 23 supra.
2"Also relevant are the provisions in art. 18, which set forth the right of every person "to
freedom of thought, conscience and religion" and include the "freedom, either alone or in com-
munity with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in teaching" or
practice. Article 26 recognizes an interconnected right to education, and art. 20 recognized the
"freedom of peaceful assembly and association" that may also be relevant to media group forma-
tion or the formation of any group that intends to publish information for its members and/or
others. Article 1 of the Declaration provides that all human beings "are born free and equal in
dignity and rights." Article 2 provides that all rights and freedoms are to be implemented
"without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other
opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status"; thus adding other sets of im-
permissible human right distinctions among individuals to those mentioned in the U.N. Charter
and quite importantly, with regard to state claims to control the media, proscribing distinctions
made on the basis of "political or other opinion" as such. Article 7 supplements these with the
expectation that "(a)ll are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to
equal protection of the law." Article 7 also contains a phrase, however, that when integrated
with the requirements of art. 29, 2 (e.g., a just requirement in a democratic society), might
allow the state to control the media in certain cases so as to protect others from "any incitement
to . . . discrimination" in violation of the Universal Declaration (e.g., on the basis of race, sex or
political opinion). Comparable provisions are found in the 1966 Covenant. See supra note 23,
arts. 20 and 26; but see id. art. 5(2).
"The language "regardless of frontiers" seems to obviate acceptance of a state claim, such
as that of the U.S.S.R., to control all access of its citizens to foreign media under art. 2(7) of the
Charter. See also notes 21-22 sura.
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The Declaration provideth and it taketh away, but not entirely. Although the
state can impose limitations on, for example, the right to freedom of opinion
and expression, there are strict limits to the limitations.
The first such limit is that any deprivation of a relevant human right by
the state must be "determined by law." Thus excluded and impermissible are
so called extralegal or extraconstitutional deprivations by state agents or
agencies. The second qualification of state imposed deprivation is that the
relevant limitation must be "solely for the purpose of': (1) implementing the
relative rights and freedoms of other individuals, groups or society as a whole,
and (2) meeting just requirements of morality, public order and welfare. The
words "solely," "and" and "requirements" are significant conditioning words.
Third, limitations are only legally available in a state whose politico-idealogic
processes match that of a "democratic society. '29 Indeed, the state imposed
limitations must relate to the "just requirements" of "a democratic society."
Thus, idealogically relevant conclusions such as "just" and "democratic" are
necessarily a part of the consideration of whether or not a particular limita-
tion of human rights or freedoms by a given state is permissible. This is not
surprising, however, in view of several idealogically and politically significant
rights and expectations expressed elsewhere in the Universal Declaration and
in the United Nations Charter itself.30
"
9The 1966 Covenant does not mention "democratic society" in connection with free speech
provisions but does with regard to peaceful assembly and freedom of association. Nevertheless,
the 1966 Covenant recognizes the right of self-determination, which is nearly equivalent. See The
Universal Declaration, supra, note 23, art. 1, 4(1), 18-22. See also id. art. 5(2). The 1950 Euro-
pean Convention does contain the language "democratic society." See European Convention,
supra note 24, arts. 9-11. Art. 32(2) of the 1969 American Convention contains the language
"democratic society" in connection with general limitations. See American Convention, supra
note 24.
Concerning the European Convention and the additional need thereunder for "strictly re-
quired" measures in time of "public emergency which threatens the life of the nation," see Partsch,
Experiences Regarding the War and Emergency Clause (Article 15) of the European Con-
vention on Human Rights, 1 ISRAEL Y.B. ON HUMAN RIGHTS. 327 (1971), adding that such
measures "lose their legitimacy after life has normalized or the absolute necessity no longer
exists." Id. at 322. See also the Lawless Case, 5 EUR. CON. ON HUMAN RIGHTS Y.B. 320 (1969),
the first case in the European Court of Human Rights and one involving a secret army, an
emergency of an "exceptional ... crisis" nature, and an increase in terrorist activities over a long
period.
The only European case directly involving freedom of speech resulted in a Commission fin-
ding of a violation of the right to free speech but, while the matter was pending before the Euro-
pean Court, the plaintiff-complainant withdrew his case after local law was amended to correct
the deprivation. See DeBecker v. Belgium, 2 EUR. CONV. ON HUMAN RIGHTS Y.B. 214 (1960); 3
id. at 486 (1961).
"
0This is not unusual when one recognizes that a commitment to human rights and "the
dignity and worth of the human person" (U.N. CHARTER. preamble) is an idealogically relevant
commitment. See generally, McDougal, Lasswell, Reisman, supra note 14; Paust, supra note 15,
at 85-87, 93, and 115. See also Paust, Human Dignity as a Constitutional Right: A Jurispurden-
tially Based Inquiry Into Criteria and Content, forthcoming; McDougalJurisprudence for a Free
Society, 1 GA. L. Ray. 1 (1966).
1978]
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To generalize, the Universal Declaration and the U.N. Charter express a
fundamental demand of individuals to human dignity"1 and of political
societies to self-determination.3 2 Neither of these demands is idealogically
neutral, for both stand in opposition to the denial of the dignity and worth of
each individual member of society and to the thwarting of self-determination
through totalitarian controls manipulated by "rightniks" or "leftniks" or by
any political elite which denies a full and free participation of all persons in
the political process of a given society-the full and free determination of an
aggregate self.
What is even more significant with regard to the ideologically and
politically loaded phrase "democratic society" that is set forth in Article 29 of
the Universal Declaration is the more specific content contained in Article 21
of the Declaration. Individual worth, freedom, dignity and equality are all
important idealogic components of democracy, and Article 21 mirrors these
in the first two paragraphs to the extent that they recognize the right of every
person "to take part in" the governmental process of one's country and to
"equal access to public service." The more significant content of Article 21,
however, is set forth in paragraph 3:
The will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government; this
will shall be expressed in periodic and genuine elections which shall be held
by secret vote or by equivalent free voting procedures.
ss
A "democratic society," the Universal Declaration affirms, is one in which the
"will of the people" is the basis of authority. The authority of the government
exists lawfully on no other basis, in no other form.
With the above in mind, one can begin to explore potential uses of the
more objective indicators of "just requirements" and "democratic society."
For example, it hardly seems probable that any relatively objective decision-
maker would accept a state claim to prohibit the free expression of political
ideas by the vast majority of the population of such a state under the guise of
anti-terrorist controls, even when many of the members of such a populace
are "sympathizers" with non-state terrorist political and ideologic goals which
"
1See generally Paust, Human Dignity, supra note 30. The preamble to the U.N. Charter,
which is as relevant as the articles of a treaty to its meaning, (for example see Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties, U.N.T.S. (1969), art. 31(2), reprinted at 63 AM. J. INT'L L. 875 (1969))
reaffirms both the "dignity and worth of the human person" and the "equal rights of men and
women." Article 1, 3 and art. 55, c of the Charter add the expectation that, human rights
and fundamental freedoms shall be implemented "without distinction as to race, sex, language,
or religion." Moreover, as mentioned, art. 1, 2 of the Charter affirms the ideologically loaded
principle of self-determination.
"See generally Suzuki, Extraconstitutional Change and World Public Order: A Prologue to
Decision-Making, 15 HOUSTON L. REV. 23 (1977); Suzuki, Self-Determination and World Public
Order: Community Response to Territorial Separation, 16 VA. J. INT'L L. 779 (1976); Chen, Self-
Determination as a Human Right, in TOWARD WORLD ORDER AND HUMAN DIGNITY
(W.M. Reisman & B. Weston eds. 1976): Paust, A Definitional Focus, in SELF DETERMINATION:
NATIONAL, REGIONAL. AND GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES (Y. Alexander, & R. Friedlander eds. 1978).3S5ee also supra note 32.
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include the demand for self-determination and a change in the government.
Such a state would hardly be one with a "democratic" society composed of in-
dividuals who were treated with equal dignity and worth by the government,
and such a government would hardly be one which reflected the "will of the
people." Not only would such a government be non-democratic and, since it
did not allow the will of the people to be expressed, one without a basis in
authority, but the claim of such a government to control the free expression
of political ideas by the vast majority of the population would hardly serve
"the just requirements" of a democratic society.
Thus, a claim by such a government to regulate the political content of
newspapers, radio and television under the guise of anti-terrorist controls
should be denied on the basis of Articles 18 and 19 of the Universal Declara-
tion. These articles declare the rights to freedom of thought, conscience,
opinion, expression, the receipt and dissemination of information and ideas
which are not permissibly limited by Article 29(2) under the circumstances, as
interpreted and supplemented by consideration of Articles 1, 2, 7 and 21.
Furthermore, such a governmental claim would not only violate relevant
human rights norms but would also thwart the right of the people of such a
state to self-determination. To the extent that force was used to police the
prohibition of a free political expression, arguably Article 2, paragraph 4 of
the United Nations Charter would also be violated, for the government would
be using force in a manner inconsistent with the purposes of the U.N.
Charter (i.e., in violation of human rights and the right of the people to self-
determination),24
S41d.; Paust, A Survey of Possible Responses to International Terrorism: Prevention,
Punishment, and Cooperative Action, 5 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 431, 460-62 (1975). Such a con-
clusion about appropriate interpretation of the Charter is now clearly supported by the 1970
Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-Operation.
Relevant provisions of the Declaration express the expectation of the international community
that "all peoples have the right freely to determine" their political, economic, social and cultural
processes; that "every State has the duty to respect this right" and "the duty to promote" the
realization of self-determination; and, as expressed twice in the same instrument, that every state
"has the duty to refrain from any forcible action which deprives" a relevant people "of their right
to self-determination and freedom and independence." U.N.G.A. Res. 2625, 25 U.N. GAOR,
Supp. No. 28, at 121, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1970) (unanimous vote).
The Declaration on Principles of International Law also supplements art. 21 of the Univer-
sal Declaration of Human Rights, for its equates self-determination, and thus authority, with a
freely expressed, consensual will of the people. As the Declaration states, a state that complies
with the principle of equal rights and self-determination is one "possessed of a government
representing the whole people belonging to the territory without distinction as to race, creed or
colour." Id. A state that complies with the principle of equal rights and self-determination is one
possessed of a government representing each and every person, the whole people, belonging to its
territory and a government that represents each and every person "without distinction as to race,
creed or colour." No other state complies; no other political elite maintains its control in accor-
dance with the "right" to self-determination. Indeed, without a free participation of a given peo-
ple in the governmental process, it would be incorrect to state that such a people enjoy "the right
freely to determine . . . their political status" and it would surely be incorrect to state that the
political elite governs in accordance with "the freely expressed will of the peoples concerned."
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Also relevant to our inquiry are the developing legal principles that might
apply to journalists in specific transnational contexts. The United Nations
General Asembly has recognized one of these, the expectation that journalists
should be provided special protection in times of international armed con-
flict.35 In view of all that will be disclosed in this article, that is rather an
amazing accomplishment for the General Assembly since in times of relative
peace journalists in many of the member countries are imprisoned without
trial, tortured and murdered. One would think then that when more was sup-
posedly at stake, in time of war or violent insurgency, insecure state elites
would be even less likely to permit freedoms of speech and press much less
special journalist protection. Nevertheless, the General Assembly resolutions
press for the recognition of such special protection by the conferees at Geneva
that seek to formulate two new Protocols for supplementation of existing laws
of armed conflict and human rights.3 6
A second major development is the documented expectation, which is not
"technically" legally binding, in the Final Act of the Conference on Security
and Cooperation in Europe at Helsinki on August 1, 1975 (the Helsinki
agreement).37 The thirty-four signators to the Helsinki agreement expressed
their "aim": "to facilitate the freer and wider dissemination of information of
all kinds, to encourage cooperation in the field of information and the ex-
change of information with other countries, and to improve the conditions
under which journalists from one participating state exercise their profession
in another participating state .... 38,, More specifically, the signators express-
ed their "intention" to "facilitate the improvement of the dissemination, on
their territory, of newspapers and printed publications . . . from the other
participating states. . ." And, for our purposes, there was a significant ex-
pression of intent to ease visa and travel restrictions for journalists and to im-
prove upon two important needs of a free media through increase of "the op-
portunities for journalists . . . to communicate personally with their sources,
including organizations and official institutions" and the enabling of jour-
nalists: "to transmit completely, normally and rapidly by means recognized by
the participating states to the information organs which they represent, the
results of their professional activity, including tape recordings and
"
5See U.N.G.A. Res. 3245 (XXIX) (Nov. 29, 1974) (Report A/9865); U.N.G.A. Res. 3058
(XXVIII) (Nov. 2, 1973) (Report A/9234); U.N.G.A. Res. 2854 (XXVI) (Dec. 20, 1971);
U.N.G.A. Res. 2673 (XXV) (Dec. 9, 1970).
"
6See id. Such protection will probably be forthcoming. See ASIL, 16 INTL L. MAT. 1426
(Nov. 1977); U.N.S.G. Reports, Respect for Human Rights in Armed Conflicts, U.N. Doc.
A/31/163 (Aug. 18, 1976) at 14, and U.N. Doc. A/10195 (Sept. 5, 1975), at 23 and 64-65
(Committee approval of an addition to Protocol I for "journalists engaged in dangerous profes-
sional missions in areas of armed conflicts").
"Journalist provisions reprinted at U.S. Dep't State, DIGEST OF UNITED STATES PRACTICE IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW 1975, at 236-38 (E. McDowell ed. 1976); entire text reprinted at 73 DEP-r
STATE BULL. 323 (Sept. 1, 1975); cf. id., Art. X (states will "pay due regard to and implement
the provisions in the Final Act").381d.
[Vol. 53:621
INTERNATIONAL LAW




The Helsinki agreement, as the reader probably knows, also expressed an im-
portant commitment of the signators to the implementation of human rights
for their own people.40 In legal effect, however, such a pledge is merely a
reaffirmation of member duties under Articles 55(c) and 56 of the United
Nations Charter. 41 The Charter, moreover, supercedes any inconsistent agree-
ment between states. 42
SUSPECT AND UNLAWFUL PATTERNS OF STATE PRACTICE
Actions against enemies of the king were always conducted in an excep-
tional manner; the procedure was simplified as much as possible; flimsy pro-
ofs which would not have sufficed for ordinary crimes were accepted: the
endeavour was to make a terrible and profoundly intimidating example. All
this is to be found in Robespierre's legislation . . . 'The proof necessary to
condemn the enemies of the people is any kind . . Juries in giving their ver-
dict should be guided solely by what love of their country indicates . . .' We
have in this celebrated Terrorist Law the strongest expression of the theory of
the predominance of the State. 4'
So wrote Georges Sorel about the rise of the cult of "the state," political
courts, "imaginary crimes" and a terrorist law of the 1700's. After reading the
following survey of state power, martial "laws" and "courts," and the im-
prisonment of journalists and others who dare to defy or who are merely
"suspect" one wonders how far society has progressed. If it is true, as assumed
here, that in the name of "national security" power elites demonstrate their
own insecurity, then much of the power wielded by state elites is insecure or
the perceptions of much of the world's state power elites are that their power
is insecure, or both.
3 Id.
"
0 See id., Art. VII: "The participating states will respect human right and fundamental
freedoms .... [and] will act in conformity with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the
United Nations and with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights."
"A similar reaffirmation of this legal expectation is documented in the Proclamation of
Tehran, for the International Conference on Human Rights in 1968. Stressing freedom and in-
dividual dignity, the Proclamation stated that gross denials of human rights arising from
discrimination on grounds of belief or expressions of opinion, among others, outrages the cons-
cience of mankind and endangers the foundations of freedom, justice and peace in the world.
U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 32/41 (1968), reprnted at I. BROWNLIE, BAsIc DocuMENTs ON HUMAN
RIGHTs 253 (Oxford 1971). The Proclamation also stressed that "It is imperative that the
members of the international community fulfil their solemn obligations to promote and en-
courage respect for human rights" and that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights "states a
common understanding of the peoples of the world concerning the inalienable and inviolate
rights of all ... and constitutes an obligation for the members of the international community."
Id. See also supra note 18 concerning the domestic relevance of such an expectation, especially
with regard to the ninth amendment, see Paust supra note 6.
"See U.N. CHARTER, art. 103. This was expressly recognized in the Helsinki Final Act,
supra note 32, Art. X.
1"G. SOREL, REFLECTIONS ON VIOLENCE 124-25 (1950).
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A pervasive insecurity is evident in a world dominated by the state
political system, with its hedges against international concern like Article 2(7)
of the U.N. Charter." What is perhaps equally pervasive is an oppression of
"the people" in most of the states on our globe and, concomitantly, a denial
of their basic human rights. The oppression that our forefathers were con-
cerned about and fought in the 17th Century has not subsided elsewhere, it
has intensified. A recent Freedom House survey, 45 to cite merely one piece of
evidence, classifies states as "free," "partly free" and "not free." Their results
are shocking. About one half of the states and one half of the world's popula-
tion are "not free,"" and one could have serious reservations about some of
the "partly free" classifications (e.g., South Africa, Nicaragua, Indonesia, to
name a few). Added together, the not free and only partly free comprise
80.3% of the world's population. The following pages demonstrate, to a cer-
tain extent, why this is so. Further, with such a widespread oppression in
mind, one must seriously question at this time in our history whether all of
the legal pronouncements and practices of states actually represent authority.
Most certainly if the will of the people is not reflected in state elite pro-
nouncements and practice, then there may be as yet no demonstrated opinio
juris or generally shared legal expectation by mere state pronouncements
alone which constitutes the basis of lawful authority recognized in Article 21
of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. There should be no confusion
then that law violators can determine the nature and content of law. Never-
theless, the focus here is on suspect and unlawful patterns, with an analysis of
comparative trends in oppression.
In their study of non-conforming political opinion and human rights,
Professors McDougal, Lasswell and Chen disclose related trends of repression
of non-conformist political and other expression. 47 They add that in modern
times there has been more tolerance of religious non-conformists but substan-
tially increased intolerance of political non-conformists within state systems;4
but, as the present article demonstrates, when religious leaders speak out
about social injustices and violations of human rights by state elites they are
often equated with terrorists and political dissenters. When they are, they suf-
fer similar treatment and deprivation at the hands of power elites and their
agents. Many of the findings of McDougal, Lasswell and Chen are also rele-
vant to control of the media in the name of national security, the suppression
of dissent and the exploitation of all media for systematic indoctrination. 49
"See note 21 supra; Korey, The Key to Human Rights-Implementation (CEIP Pam. No.
570, Nov. 1968); Paust, An International Structure for Implementation of the 1949 Geneva Con-
ventions: Needs and Function Analysis, 1 YALE STUDIES IN WORLD PUB. ORDER 148, 165-68
(1974).
45See N.Y. Times, Dec. 22, 1975, at 12, col. 2.
4"Id.
47See McDougal, Lasswell & Chen, supra note 4, and authorities cited therein.
481d. at 2.
4'See id. at 4-5.
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Far worse, as the present study also demonstrates: "For non-conformers in
general, due process of law is a luxury: arbitrary arrest, detention, trial (or
non-trial), and imprisonment are the trademarks of contemporary political
barbarism." 50
South Africa
One of the significant and growing threats to democracy, self-
determination and human rights is posed in the practice of certain govern-
ments that seek to control and manipulate the media in the name of anti-
terror. One such government is that of South Africa. Indeed, the present
government of South Africa has employed the very sort of controls over the
free expression of political ideas by the vast majority of the people in South
Africa that were condemned in previous discussion of legal policies at stake as
impermissible claims, claims which do not serve "the just requirements" of a
"democratic society." Moreover, the actions of that government carried out in
the name of anti-terror led recently to world condemnation.
The South African government has taken action not only to control
media coverage and ideas but to ban the principal black newspaper, which
was also the second largest South African daily, and arrest its editor."1 It also
has outlawed the Christian Institute of Southern Africa and its ecumenical
head for criticism of the government's racist apartheid policies and its
publications which disclosed the use of detention without trial and demanded
an inquiry into the deaths of detainees.5 2 Other black political groups have
been outlawed and some fifty people have joined the ranks of other political
detainees or arrestees jailed or assigned the inhumane and degrading punish-
ment of "banning."5 3 In South Africa, the arrest, detention or banning of
newspaper editors and journalists is not unusual. 5' Indeed, there had been
'Old. at 7.
51See South Africans Ban Major Black Groups, Close Leading Paper, N.Y. Times, Oct. 20,
1977, at 1, cols. 5-6; N.Y. Times, Oct. 21, 1977, at 14, col. 1.52N.Y. Times, Oct. 20, 1977, at 1, col. 6. On the Christian Institute's previous criticism,
see N.Y. Times, Sept. 21, 1976, at 6, col. 1.
5 On the unique banning punishment, see N.Y. Times, Oct. 27, 1977, at 8, col. 1; N.Y.
Times, Oct. 24, 1977, at 2, col. 3; N.Y. Times, Oct. 20, 1977, at 10, col. 5, adding that banned
individuals may not speak on the radio or be quoted in newspapers.
54See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Feb. 26, 1978, at 5, col. 6; N.Y. Times, Dec. 13, 1977, at 7, col.
1 (editor Woods); N.Y. Times, Nov. 3, 1977, at 12, col. 3 (PEN study discloses 12 writers under.
banning orders); N.Y. Times, Oct. 27, 1977, at 8, col. 1; N.Y. Times, April 29, 1977, at 12,
col. 3 (Amnesty International discloses names of six journalists detained, but some names were
omitted purposely); N.Y. Times, Feb. 23, 1977, at 2, col. 3 (South African photographer who
won top journalism prize had previously been detained twice, for 2-1/2 months and 23 months);
N.Y. Times, Dec. 21, 1976, at 12, col. 3 (mentioning nine detained journalists, only one of
which was listed by AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL); N.Y. Times, Dec. 15, 1976, at 12, col. 3
(mentioning 7 arrests and 3 detentions ranging from several hours to several weeks, none of
which were listed by Amnesty International); South Africa Threatens Restraints on the Press,
N.Y. Times, Aug. 15, 1976, at 1, col. 3 (4 journalists arrested); Editor Sentenced by South
Africa, N.Y. Times, Feb. 15, 1976, at 21, col. 1.
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veiled threats against, and a reprimand of, another major newspaper just
twelve days before the deprivations imposed on the black newspaper and its
personnel. 55
The South African Information Minister told foreign correspondents that
the closing of the major black newspaper "should be construed by other
newspapers as a warning 'not to abuse' the right of criticism [and that] the
Government would not hesitate to close other publications 'if the state is en-
dangered or law and order threatened.' 5 6 It had not hesitated before, and
will probably continue not to hesitate5 7 until more effective sanctions are im-
posed by the international community for South Africa's violations of human
rights, fundamental freedoms and the principle of self-determination. The
blatant arrogance of its disregard for human rights, much less the restraints
on an otherwise broad power to limit relevant rights where necessary to pro-
tect certain "just requirements" in a "democratic society," is also evident in
the Justice Minister's formal statement on the bannings and detentions. "En-
dangered" and "threatened" were the words that the Information Minister
utilized in an attempt to justify the government's acts. 58
The Justice Minister, while also disclosing some of the relevant "due" pro-
cess approaches of a secrefied government, added the following justification
for bannings and detentions:
committees consisting of a regional magistrate as chairman and two other
lawyers as assessors were appointed in terms of Section 17 of the Internal
Security Act (1950) to make factual reports in relation to certain organiza-
tions and publications.
The facts contained in these reports leave no doubt that the activities of
the organizations mentioned in the Goverment Gazette endanger the
maintenance of law and order, and the publications mentioned in the
Government Gazette serve, inter alia, as means for expressing views the
publication of which is calculated to endanger the maintenance of public
order. 59
The Minister's concluding threat portends an even broader base of insecurity:
"Persons who believe that the Government will allow itself to be intimidated
15 See Reprimand to Press Worries South African Editors, N.Y. Times, Oct. 10, 1977, at
16, col. 1; South Africa Moves to Curb Newspapers Reporting on Death of Biko, N.Y. Times,
Oct. 8, 1977, at 7, col. 3.
5 See N.Y. Times, Oct. 20, 1977, at 10, col. 1. See also infra note 60.5
ndeed, later at least five foreign correspondents were arrested and detained a few hours.
See N.Y. Times, Jan. 23, 1978, at 7, col. 1.
58The Justice Minister repeated the word "endanger" three times and seemed to stress
"unrest" between blacks and whites as well as the government claim that a "small group of anar-
chists" are manipulating "organizations, publications, people, and almost exclusively the young
people, to create a revolutionary climate and to organize unrest." See id. (text of statement). Ap-
parently contributing to the unrest, however, is the fact that blacks cannot vote in South Africa
and must suffer the evils of apartheid. See notes 70-77 infra. Moreover, there is a fundamental
unreality about statements that anarchists would organize anything, much less control organiza-
tions.
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and prescribed to are making a big mistake. '60 No one should be mistaken
about the activities of an intimidated elitist government that is hardly mind-
ful of democratic principles however. 6
1
After the earlier newspaper and organizational bans and detentions the
United States issued a warning to South Africa, but Prime Minister Vorster
termed the U.S. warning "irrelevant.
' 62
A mandatory arms embargo was soon unanimously approved by the
United Nations Security Council, 3 however, which reiterated a United Na-
tions abhorrence of the racist governmental policy of apartheid and con-
demned South Africa for, among other things, its "acts of repression" and
"defiant continuance of the system of apartheid."164 Private groups, such as
the United States National Council of Churches and the American Society of
Newspaper Editors, added their voices to the growing public protest of South
Africa's illegal measures of suppression, terror and apartheid; 6 but the South
African government remains intransigent.
66
60Id. (emphasis added). See also specific language of the Terrorism Act (e.g., "embarrass"),
note 81 infra.
61In the next few weeks 626 blacks, including 198 schoolchildren, were arrested for
passbook-law violations (all blacks must carry a passbook and obtain permission to enter white
areas, which include nearly all of South Africa's urban areas) or other "crimes" after a six hour,
house-to-house sweep by police of a black township near Pretoria. See N.Y. Times, Nov. 11,
1977, at 1, col. I (Schoolchildren had been boycotting classes to protest the inferior black educa-
tion systems.).
62See N.Y. Times, Oct. 21, 1977, at 1, col. 3. See also, Vorster Says Whites Can Withstand
U.N. Pressure, N.Y. Times, Nov. 9, 1977, at 6, col. 1; Editor Tells U.N. South Africa Views
Embargoes as Joke, N.Y. Times, Jan. 27, 1978, at 3, col. 1.
"The African Subcommittee of the United States House of Representatives International
Relations Committee urged President Carter "to take effective measures against the Republic of
South Africa in order to register the deep concern of the American people about the continued
violation of human rights in that country." See N.Y. Times, Oct. 27, 1977, at 9, col. 4. See also
N.Y. Times, Oct. 22, 1977, at 1, col. 4. The Carter Administration, which had welcomed the
Subcommittee statement, shifted from a previous U.S. hesitancy with regard to mandatory U.N.
economic sanctions and openly supported a mandatory U.N. Security Council arms embargo
against South Africa. The Carter Administration also openly criticized the South African Inquest
results concerning the death of Mr. Biko, a black leader detained without trial. See N.Y. Times,
Dec. 3, 1977, at 1, cols. 1 and 2. U.S. law would also seem to demand an arms embargo in this
case. See 22 U.S.C. § 2304 (1974), as amended (1976).
64See N.Y. Times, Nov. 5, 1977, at 1, col. 6; id. at 7, col. 1 (text of U.N. Security Council
Resolution); N.Y. Times, Nov. 3, 1977, at 1, col. 4. The fact of the U.N. Security Council man-
datory sanctions also demonstrates the increasing expectation that such systematic violations of
human rights are of international concern and thus not essentially domestic matters within art.
2(7) of the Charter. In this case the Security Council also declared that South Africa's policies
and activities contribute to a threat to the peace.
Later the U.N. General Assembly voted to ask the Security Council to impose an additional
oil embargo against South Africa. See N.Y. Times, Dec. 17, 1977, at 9, col. 1.
"See N.Y. Times, Nov. 11, 1977, at 6, col. 1 (NCC); N.Y. Times, Oct. 21, 1977, at 14,
col. 6 (ASNE). See also AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, REPORT ON TORTuRE 123-28 (London 1973);
N.Y. Times, April 29, 1977, at 12, col. 3 (Amnesty International); N.Y. Times, Nov. 3, 1977, at
12, col. 3 (study by PEN). On the permissibility of private sanction efforts in general, see Paust,
supra note 15.
"See also, Vorster Says Whites Can Withstand U.N. Pressure, N.Y. Times, Nov. 9, 1977,
at 6, col. 1.
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It will be difficult, to say the least, to compel such a government to fulfil
its treaty obligations to implement human rights and fundamental freedoms
for its own people and to refrain from further impermissible measures of
force, controls and manipulations of the media. South Africa has been
violating relevant norms for over twenty-five years and the violence is increas-
ing.67 Although its racist and oppressive governmental policies have continued
to be strong catalysts for the general development of human right sanction ef-
forts,68 those efforts have not yet been effective. In South Africa, the 1950
Suppression of Communism Act, the 1960 Emergency Regulations, the 1965
Official Secrets Act, to name a few, not only continue in force but multiply. 69
To date, South Africa remains the first and only state member of the United
Nations to have a mandatory economic sanction imposed against it. The first
stone has been cast. Here, a review of South African legislative enactments
and the actual controls imposed is useful not merely to throw stones (I would
throw boulders) but for comparison with those of other states and an
awareness of the potential, if not real, abuses of governmental power there
and elsewhere.
The South African government began its totalitarian efforts at control in
1950 with the adoption of the Population Registration Act, No. 30, and the
Suppression of Communism Act, No. 44. 70 Already mixed marriages were
prohibited by the Prohibition of Mixed Marriages Act, No. 55 of 1949, and
illicit sex between africans and whites was prohibited by the Immorality
Amendment Act, No. 21 of 1950. 7 1 The Population Registration Act fur-
thered apartheid controls by classifying the population by race and requiring
the compilation of population registers and the issuance of identity cards. 72
67See N.Y. Times, Nov. 11, 1977, at 6, col. 1, quoting from a National Council of Chur-
ches statement that "more than 1,000 African students and young people protesting apartheid
were killed by the police in 1976," not to mention those injured or arrested. At least 45 have died
in detention. See N.Y. Times, Sept. 20, 1977, at 5, col. 1. See also note 88 infra.
6 See, e.g., J. CAREY. supra note 23, at 84, 95, 143, passim (1971).
"One might even ask whether South Africa's legislatively approved manipulation of the
media has become a model for other governments that, in the name of anti-terror, seek to con-
trol political dissent and detain or "ban" political opponents of governmental control and other
dissidents or nonconformists. In any event, legislative or executive decrees that attempt to justify
(at least domestically) similar controls are being increasingly formulated by developing and
developed countries, "Souniks" and "Norniks" in every region of the globe, and many are similar
to those developed by South Africa. South Africa even defends its controls by pointing to the
hypocrisy of other governments that condemn South Africa for its control of the media; but the
context of racil apartheid, with blatant racism and the widespread denial of human dignity, has
united numerous governments and private groups against such action more often than in any
other cases.70See M. HORRELL, Legislation and Race Relations 13 (1971).
71id.
'2See also, Unterhalter, Apartheid Legislation and Our Inherited Understanding of the
Law, in LAW. JUSTICE AND SOCIETY 11, 14 (P. Randall ed. 1972); MacArthur, Apartheid, the
Courts and the Legal Profession, in id. at 35, 37-39, a report of the legal Commission of the
Study Project on Christianity in Apartheid Society. One contributor points out that under these
or similar laws one out of four African adults is arrested each year, thus producing significant




The Suppression of Communism Act allowed the Minister of Justice "to ban
organizations and publications and to prohibit gatherings if he considered
that these were furthering or were likely to further the aims of
communism." 3
Newer legislation or executive measures made the controls of free speech
and press even more certain. In 1960, the Governor-General proclaimed a
state of emergency throughout most of the country after the Sharpewille kill-
ings and other violent acts. Far-reaching emergency regulations were pro-
mulgated which permitted magistrates and commissioned officers to detain
people "if this was considered desirable in the interests of public order or of
the person concerned" and made it an offense to disclose the names of those
persons detained unless the Minister of the Interior consented." 74 Other
restraints of speech or publication included the following:
(a) It was made an offence to utter, issue, or distribute any subversive state-
ment, which was defined as a statement likely to subvert the Government's
authority; to incite others to resist or oppose measures taken under the
emergency regulations; to cause feelings of hostility towards others; or to
cause alarm.
(b) It was also made an offence to threaten anyone with harm unless he took
a certain course of action; and to incite anyone to stay away from or retard
his work, or to protest against any law with intent to exact concessions or to
achieve any political or economic aim.
(c) The Minister of the Interior was empowered to order any newspaper or
periodical to cease publication if he considered that it had systematically
published matter of a subversive nature. He could order any association con-
sidered by him to be subversive to discontinue its activities. 75
Apparently there were many protests of such laws with an intent to exact a
political aim (perhaps democracy), for nearly 12,000 people were detained
during the first year of the operation of these regulations. 6 Also at this time,
emergency regulations were promulgated for the blacks in the Transkei under
which similar forms of detention were implemented and offenses were created
73d. at 89. See also id. at 111; N.Y. Times, Aug. 15, 1976, at 1, col. 3 (4 journalists ar-
rested under the Communism Act). If the Minister's discretion to 'prohibit publications was not
broad enough with words such as "furthering" or "likely to further," certainly the definition of
"communism" provided potentially new inroads on the freedoms of speech and press. As the
South African Institute of Race Relations explains:
In this Act the term "communism" was very widely defined, to include not only
the doctrine of Marxian socialism, but also any doctrine or scheme which aims at br-
inging about any political, industrial, social, or ecnomic change within South Africa
by promotion of disturbance or disorder, or by unlawful acts or omissions, or which
aims at the encouragement of feelings of hostitility between black and white, the con-
sequences of which are calculated to further the achievement of doctrines or schemes
such as those mentioned.
Id. If the subsequent actions of the Minister et al. are any clue, apparently there are a lot of
"communists" in South Africa.
"'See id. at 94-95.
"Id. at 95.
1Id. (by government admission).
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to punish those "present at an unlawful meeting" or those who "make any
statement or perform any action likely to have the effect of interfering with
the authority of the state" or "one of its officials." 77 Rarely have totalitarian
controls been so expressly permitted.78
In 1962, the General Law Amendment Act made it an offense to record,
reproduce or disseminate any speech, writing or recording thereof, made
anywhere, at any time, by a person prohibited from attending public gather-
ings. 79 In 1965, the Official Secrets Amendment Act, No. 65, made it a
crime for any person to have "in his possession or under his control any
sketch, plan, model, article, note, document or information which to
... any military or police matter and who publishes it or directly or indirectly
communicates it to any person in any manner for any purpose prejudicial to
the safety or interests of the state."8 10
In 1967, the Terrorism Act, No. 83, defined "terrorism" in an overly
broad manner,81 shifted the burden onto those detained or arrested (which
almost always occurs when the government has no proof that will support a
conviction of ordinary crime) to prove an intention not to commit terrorism,
prohibited any ordinary trial of the accused, prohibited even a summary trial
without written approval of the Attorney-General, authorized detention
without trial of suspects and any person believed to be "withholding informa-
tion relating to terrorists or to offenses under the Act," prohibited any court
of law from pronouncing on the validity of any action taken, and prohibited
media or other access to a detained person or to information about such a
person except as approved by a relevant government official.8 2
771d. at 98 (emphasis added). See also N.Y. Times, Sept. 16, 1977, at 1, col. 2 (political
gatherings banned); N.Y. Times, Aug. 9, 1977, at 1, col. 2 (public meetings banned). The 1967
Terrorism Act also prohibited certain acts intended "to embarrass the administration of the af-
fairs of the State." See Dugard, South West Africa and the "Terrorist Trial", 64 AM. J. INTL L.
19, 22 (1970).
18See also N.Y. Times, Oct. 27, 1977, at 8, col. 1, depicting the jurisprudential base of the
white government and followers (which is positivist) as "an almost obsessive concern with
legalisms." On related dangers of positivism in general (which the author terms negativism), see
Paust, The Concept of Norm: A Consideration of the Jurisprudential Views of Hart, Kelsen and
McDougal-Lasswell, forthcoming; Paust, supra note 6; McDougal, Lasswell & Reisman, supra
note 13; Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law, 71 HARv. L. Rv. 630, 659 (1958); Unterhalter,
MacArthur & van Niekerk, supra note 72.
79See HORRELL, supra note 70, at 99 and 112.
8 Id. at 103. See also id. at 113. As the reader might have noted, such would prohibit far
more than the Pentagon Papers, including as it does any information which relates to any
military or police matter.
"
tFor example, Section 2 of the Terrorism Act lists twelve outcomes which comprise activity
directed at endangering "the maintenance of law and order" to include acts engaged in: (a) to
cause or promote general dislocation, (b) to cripple or prejudice any industry, (c) to encourage
feelings of hostitility between white and other inhabitants of the Republic [acts which the
Government itself might easily be judged to have engaged in], and (d) to embarrass the ad-
ministration or the affairs of the State. The burden of proof is placed on the accused to show
that the acts were not engaged in for such purposes. See also infra note 82.
"
2See id. at 107-08. See also, Unterhalter, supra note 72, at 17; van Niekerk, id. at 61;
Dugard, South African Lawyers and the Liberal Heritage of the Law, in LAw. JUSTICE AND SOCIE-
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In each case when several detained persons were tortured by the govern-
ment or had been secretly detained, the judiciary refused to investigate the
matter" or openly approved the power of the legislature with positivist
justifications of judicial impotence comparable to those of our own Rehnquist
and Black84 or the Nazi judges of the past.85 As South African law professor
John Dugard reports, when Chief Justice Steyn was asked about the failure of
the courts to inquire into such matters he replied, in a typically positivist
fashion: "It would be an evil day for the administration of justice if our
courts should deviate from the well recognized tradition of giving politics as
wide a berth as their work permits . ..it is not our function to write an in-
dignant codicil to the will of Parliament."8 6
So confused about evil, justice, tradition, authority functions and the
dignity of courts and human beings are the South African judges in general,
Professor Dugard seems to say, that their positivistic deference to raw power
has added "to an increasingly evil legislative order" in a way not unlike the
myopic and unrealistic positivism of German lawyers of the 1930s.8 7 Perhaps
like the earlier German lawyers South African positivists allow a pretense of
law and authority when hundreds of thousands are detained, thousands are
TY 19, 27 (P. Randall ed. 1972). Dugard, supra note 77, at 21-24; AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL.
supra note 65, at 123-25; Suzman, South Africa and the Rule of Law, 85 S. AF. L.J. 261 (1968).
See also N.Y. Times, Dec. 22, 1976, at 12, col. 4.
8 5See AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, supra note 65, at 125 (judge replied that torture during
427 days of detention was not the concern of his court) and 127; P. RANDALL, supra note 72, at
17, 27-28, 61; Dugard, supra note 77, at 21-24; Dugard, Judges, Academics and Unjust Laws:
the Van Niekerk Contempt Case, 89 S. AF. L.J. 271 (1972); cf., N.Y. Times, Nov. 26, 1977, at
6, col. 3 (South Africa's highest court quashed the conviction of a banned newspaper editor, who
refused to identify his news sources, "on a technicality").
'I have in mind Rehnquist's quoting of Black in Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v.
Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 784 (1976) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Com-
pare such with the South African statements, the text infra at note 86.
A good counter to such nonsense may be found in the opinions of Justice Frankfurter and
several of the earlier American Legal Realists writings. See, e.g., Rochin v. Calif., 342 U.S. 165,
169-70 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., opinion); Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459,
468 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., concurring); Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional
Approach, 35 COLUM. L. REv. 809 (1935); Llewellyn, A Realistic Jurisprudence-The Next
Step?, 30 CoLUM. L. REV. 431 (1930); McDougal, Fuller v. The American Legal Realists: An In-
tervention, 50 YALE L.J. 827 (1941); Miller & Howell, The Myth of Neutrality in Constitutional
Adjudication, 27 U. CHI. L. REV. 661 (1960). See also H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 12
and 200 (1961); H. LASSWELL, A PRE-VIEw OF POLICY SCIENCES 40-44 (1971); Paust, Dum-dum
Bullets, Law and "Objective" Scientific Research: The Need for a Configurative Approach to
Decision, 18 JuoiamETics J. 268 (1978).
"See Fuller, supra note 78, quoted by Dugard supra note 82, at 33, who adds: "the strict
legal positivism of South African lawyers has no place in an unrepresentative political order."
86Dugard supra note 82, at 27-28. It is perhaps curious to American lawyers that "codicial"
is used with relation to "will." Codicils to wills are made with some sort of contemplation of
death-an image obviously not intended.
"See id. at 27-28 and 32-33, quoting Professor Fuller: "The German lawyer was therefore
peculiarly prepared to accept as 'law' anything that called itself by that name, was printed at
government expense and seemed to come 'von oben herab'...."
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killed, 8 unknown numbers are tortured, 8a and the courts and the media90 are
controlled or finally closed. That pretense has been maintained even as law
and authority crumble. And one can easily predict that if change toward im-
plementation of human rights and dignity is not allowed through a resurgent
flow of free expression and association it will occur increasingly in violent
ways or, with the advent of increased totalitarian controls, not at all. Neither
law nor authority would fare well in such a future.
The Remainder of Africa
Looking at the Freedom House map, one sees hardly a country in Africa
labeled as "free" or "partly free." 91 The Congo, Kenya, Liberia and Nigeria
are among the few listed as "partly free," but Kenya is listed along with the
"not free" Ghana, Somalia and Tanzania in an Amnesty International list of
states that imprison journalists 92 Nigeria, despite the Freedom House label,
has been ruled by decree under a "state of emergency" and the broad powers
of the Armed Forces and Police (Special Powers) Decree No. 24 of 1967 for
ten years. Under such, the Inspector General of Police or the Chief of Staff
can order detention of anyone without trial "on being satisfied of the necessi-
ty for doing so in the national interest."9' The Nigerian military has ruled
since January 1966 and still forbids "political activities." 9' Not surprisingly,
Nigeria restricts freedom of speech and press, and intends to form a "na-
tional" press agency.95
The United States Department of State reports human rights violations in
Ethiopia and Zaire, 8 and Amnesty International reports oppression in much
of the rest of Africa.97 One clear example of a terrorist government is that of
Idi Amin of Uganda-the murderer of hundreds of thousands, including
"See note 67 supra. See also AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL. supra note 64, at 126-37; and van
Niekerk, supra note 72, at 61.
"See AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, supra note 65, at 123-28. See also supra note 67; N.Y.
Times, Jan. 19, 1978, at 33, col. 6 (routine police torture).
"Beyond the threats to and closings of newspapers as such, I include here the arrests and
detention of journalists by the South African government over a period of several years (with ex-
act figures still unknown). See notes 51 and 54 supra.
91See N.Y. Times, Dec. 22, 1976, at 12, col. 2.
"2See N.Y. Times, April 5. 1978, at 10, col. 3 (Ghana); N.Y. Times, Sept. 6, 1977, at 6,
col. 3. Kenya was listed as imprisoning at least 5; now it is at least 6. See N.Y. Times, Dec. 12,
1977, at 16, col. 1.
"See N.Y. Times, April 29, 1977, at 12, col. 3. A recent example is reported at N.Y.
Times, Jan. 4, 1978, at 9, col. 3.
94See N.Y. Times, April 23, 1978, at 8, col. 7; N.Y. Times, Nov. 19, 1977, at 7, col. 4.
95See N.Y. Times, Aug. 1, 1977, at 8, col. 6.
"See N.Y. Times, March 13, 1977, at 1, col. 6. See also "Terror Against Dissent
Acknowledged in Ethiopia," N.Y. Times, Feb. 9, 1978, at 3, col. 4 (Ethiopia); N.Y. Times, Feb.
10, 1978, at 1, col. 2; N.Y. Times, Dec. 17, 1977, at 3, col. I (Ethiopia).
9See AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL. supra note 65, at 112-38.
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writers who insult the tyrant.98 If ever tyrannicide is justifiable, it must be in
the case of Idi Amin.
Another African tyrant, who imprisons reporters from the United States,
is the world's first self-proclaimed socialist Emperor, Bokassa I of the Central
African Empire. 99 Last "but not least" on our list is the illegal regime in
Rhodesia-a regime condemned and subject to mandatory sanctions by the
United Nations Security Council (but not a member of the U.N.).100 Strict
censorship of all news media exists in Rhodesia in order (what else?) to "help
fight terrorism and subversion. "10 1 In Rhodesia, as in so many areas of our
globe in the 1970s, writers and religious leaders who criticize the government
and its deprivations of basic human rights are themselves imprisoned.
10 2
Argentina
Curiously, the 1976 Freedom House survey listed South Africa as a "part-
ly free" country, although 80 per cent are black, and one wonders then how
much worse the governmental controls of free expression and publication
must be in Argentina, which is listed by the survey as "not free."' 0 3 Never-
theless, there is no questioning of the fact that Argentina imposes strict con-
trols over the media and general political dissent under anti-terrorism and
other legislative or martial measures. A recent study by Playwrights,
Publishers, Essayists, Editorialists and Novelists [commonly known as P.E.N.],
a private writers' organization, also attributes to Argentina the largest
number of victims arrested, detained or simply "abducted" for their writings
(in fact, 119 of the listed 606 writers persecuted in some 55 countries).10 4
"See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Aug. 18, 1977, at 4, col. 4 (playwright, theater director and a
Ministry of Culture under-secretary). See also AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, supra note 65, at 134-36
(mentioning detention of British journalists).
"See N.Y. Times, Aug. 18, 1977, at 1, col. 5.
"'°See, e.g., Suzuki, Territorial Separation, supra note 32, at 816-17; Note, Security Council
Resolutions in United States Courts, 50 IND. L.J. 83 (1974); McDougal & Reisman, supra note
21.
"'1See N.Y. Times, Feb. 4, 1978, at 3, col. 1; N.Y. Times, Jan. 10, 1978, at 6, col. 3; N.Y.
Times, April 27, 1976, at 2, col. 4. Both foreign and local media are censored.
"'1See AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, MATCHBOX 14 (Fall 1977) (4 officials of the Catholic Com-
mission for Justice and Peace arrested for their publication of a report on the regime's torture of
detainees). See also U.N. Security Council Res. 253, U.N. Doc. S/RES/253 (May 29, 1978);
U.N. G.A. Res. 3297 (XXIX) (Dec. 13, 1974). As in so many countries, due process guarantees
under human rights instruments are lacking in "terrorist" trials. See N.Y. Times, Feb. 12, 1978,
at 19, col. 1.
1"'See note 45 supra.
1"'See "55 Nations Are Charged With Repressing Writers," N.Y. Times, Nov. 3, 1977, at
12, col. 3; see also N.Y. Times, March 12, 1978, at 22, col. 1. Only a few of these were listed by
Amnesty International, but Amnesty International chooses to avoid a full disclosure of names of
those held by certain countries (like Argentina) so that rights are better pursued by other means.
See N.Y. Times, April 29, 1977, at 12, col. 3. One reads of detained or disappearing Argentine
journalists too often in the last few years. See N.Y. Times, Nov. 12, 1977, at 3, col. 3 (jailed
newspaper publisher); N.Y. Times, Nov. 11, 1977, at 7, col. 3 (AP editor vanishes); N.Y. Times,
April 17, 1977, at 5, col. 1 (journalist abducted and 3 newspaper executives of La Opinion
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The military junta has gone even further in its effort to curb dissent,
however, by issuing a special decree against an already jailed publisher of the
newspaper La Opinion. The publisher was held under a power described as
"the disposition of the executive power" and the new decree deprived him of
any remaining civil rights, authorized indefinite detention without military
trial or a civilian court order, and placed all of his property in state
custody.'05 Even human rights advocates who disappear in Argentina 0 6 (or
fellow media persons who disappear and in effect become nonpersons as
well) 10 7 do not lose their property to the state-their family or relatives have
at least whatever property is left after the dissenter is himself extinguished.
Much of the killing and stifling of human rights to freedom of expression
and publication is obviously carried out extralegally; but Argentina also has
its overly broad anti-terrorist decrees to control the media and those who dis-
sent. In 1974, two such laws were enacted-a broad anti-terrorism bill that
was harsher than that of the previous government and defined and prohibited
"incitement to violence" and "illicit associations" so broadly "as to stifle
legitimate political dissent as well as left-wing terrorism;"'08 and an expansion
of the ban on names of anti-government organizations to a ban on news
coverage of terrorist acts and kidnappings altogether. 10 9 The media now is
disappear); N.Y. Times, Dec. 31, 1976, at 4, col. 1 (journalists in detention); N.Y. Times, Nov.
10, 1976, at 6, col. 1 (arrest of Spanish press agency manager); N.Y. Times, Feb. 15, 1976, at 2,
col. 3; Houston Chronicle, May 20, 1975, at 6, col. 1 (reporter killed by right-wing death squad).
Even dissenting nuns and relatives of detainees are arrested. See N.Y. Times, Jan. 29, 1978, at
12, col. 14. This seems to result from an expansion of private and governmental counter-terror.
See also N.Y. Times, Aug. 21, 1976, at 1, col. 1; N.Y. Times, April 4, 1976, at 1, col. 7; N.Y.
Times, March 22, 1976, at 6, col. 1; N.Y. Times, March 13, 1977, at E4, col. 4; AMNESTY IN-
TERNATIONAL. supra note 65, at 182-83. Hardly with any sort of precedent, however, have been
more recent actions of the military junta which led to the seizure and arrest of several Argentine
and foreign journalists covering the demonstration of some three hundred and fifty women in
front of the congress building who were protesting the disappearance of thousands in recent
years. See N.Y. Times, Oct. 16, 1977, at 33, col. 4. Cf., N.Y. Times, Nov. 10, 1976, at 6, col. 1
(arrest of Spanish press agency manager); N.Y. Times, April 29, 1977, at 12, col. 3 (Paraguayan
journalist arrested one year earlier; listed by Amnesty Int'l). Among the foreign journalists ar-
rested were "Sally Chardy of NBC Radio, Diane Page of United Press International, David Dow
of CBS-TV and Gus Bono of The Wall Street Journal." Id. It took the intervention of the United
States Embassy to achieve the release of the U.S. journalists, but others were apparently held by
the government.
'"5See N.Y. Times, Nov. 12, 1977, at 3, col. 3. See also N.Y. Times, Jan. 29, 1978, at 12,
col. 4, adding that "some 3,607 persons remain at the disposition of the executive power" by of-
ficial count (including many foreign nationals). The publisher is apparently lucky to be alive, if
he still is, for three other executives from his paper had disappeared the month after he was ar-
rested. See note 104 supra.
10sSee N.Y. Times, Sept. 22, 1977, at 9, col. I (found in detention some two weeks later).
'"ISee note 104 supra; see also Houston Post, Feb. 4, 1978, at 8A, col. 6 (AP).
108American Society of International Law, Working Group on Terrorism, Summary
of Argentine Law 2, (1976). See also N.Y. Times, Dec. 11, 1977, at 25, col. 1 (Argentine
court-martial of 8 is warning to people who "collaborate, even against their will," with leftist
guerrillas).
ls9Id. at 3-4, adding that other laws had already banned the printing of anti-government
communiques. Already Decree No. 1454 (1973) had prohibited the press from mentioning the
names of two anti-government guerrilla groups (the ERP and the Montoneros).
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"prohibited from reporting, mentioning or commenting on political violence
unless the events published are issued by the government or security
forces."'11 As in South Africa and so many other states that defile authority,
"the judicial system cannot investigate the action of security forces under the
emergency laws that have been in effect since the overthrow by the armed
forces" of the former President."' The new military junta is now safely en-
trenched behind anti-terrorist curbs of the media and the judiciary, but the
disappearance of media persons, human rights advocates and numerous at-
torneys1 2 continues.
Chile
More widely known are the restraints and deprivations imposed by the
present Chilean regime against its own people. P.E.N. lists Chile as the third
most oppressive state against writers, with a listing of fifty-seven such
victims.118 The Freedom House survey also lists Chile among the nation-states
that are "not free. 11 4 In fact, as the New York Times reports:
Since 1973 Chile has been governed by the right-wing junta led by Gen.
Augusto Pinochet, commander of the army, who calls his regime "an
authoritarian democracy." Under the junta that overthrew the government of
Salvador Allende Gossens, all periodicals have come under government con-
trol, the universities have been purged of critics, opponents have been jailed
and tortured and all political parties have been banned.-,
In 1977, President Pinochet's military-backed regime, indicated even more
strongly why an "authoritarian democracy" is double-speak about a "state of
siege." Pinochet's regime prohibited "the existence, organization, activities
and propaganda" of all the remaining non-Marxist political parties in
"
5
"Censor's Hand Hides Violence In Argentina," Wash. Post, May 6, 1976, quoted in H.
COOPER, TERRORISM AND THE MEDIA. TERRORISM: INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES 150 (Y. Alex-
ander, S. Finger eds. 1977).
"'N.Y. Times, July 18, 1977, at 3, col. 4; also see N.Y. Times, Jan. 29, 1978, at 12, col. 4.
"2See id. (mentioning the detention and/or disappearance of at least ten lawyers and one
judicial employee), adding: "Some prisoners are found dead after shootouts described in security
communiques as armed conflicts with subversives. Other have been killed while officially listed as
'trying to escape' . . ."-others are later released from detention or found dead in vacant lots or
elsewhere. In 1975 report for the International Commission of Jurists, Dr. Fragoso of Brazil listed
6 defense lawyers who have been murdered from Nov. 1973 to March 1975 and 32 lawyers then
being held in detention. See H. FRAGOSO. REPORT ON ARGENTINA (Int'l Comm. of Jurists 1975).
With regard to the treatment of lawyers in other countries, see infra re: South Korea and
the Federal Republic of Germany.
'sSee N.Y. Times, Nov. 3, 1977, at 12, col. 3 (just 21 behind the Soviet Union). See also
N.Y. Times, April 29, 1977, at 12, col. 3 (Amnesty Int'l list of imprisoned journalists-some
names omitted for this country).
"14See N.Y. Times, Dec. 22, 1976, at 12, col. 2. See also U.N.G.A. Res. 3448, 30 U.N.
GAOR - (Dec. 2, 1975) ("flagrant violations of human rights"); N.Y. Times, Jan. 5, 1978, at
12, col. 1.
115 N.Y. Times, July 10, 1977, at 4, col. 1.
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Chile.116 The President has also publicly stated that there will be no elections
in Chile for ten years-thus admitting that self-determination will not exist in
Chile for the near future. Further, the judiciary is without power to imple-
ment human rights and Chilean law against such a governmental control."
7
In the guise of "national security" a military commander can close any
radio station or newspaper in Chile and confiscate publications.1 8 A 1975
Decree Law increased penalties for media persons who commit national
security offenses and also made it a crime to carry pamphlets constituting
propaganda for outlawed parties. 19 A 1976 Decree Law expanded censorship
and allowed the military to close down any news media for printing or broad-
casting false or exaggerated reports or news that causes "alarm or disgust." 12 0
Now, the repression has been greatly expanded. Besides banning all political
parties, the regime has announced new work restrictions, the censorship of
mail and new press restrictions, "including a ban on unauthorized printing of
news magazines or newspapers and the importing of foreign publications.' 2 1
The totalitarian attempts of the present regime have thus made it a leading
violator of fundamental human rights. 22 It has surpassed the broadest con-
trols of its predecessor, the anti-democratic, anti-communist, pro-socialist
Allende regime. 123
Other Latin American States
In addition to the overly broad controls of free speech and publication
extant in Argentina and Chile, impermissibly restrictive anti-terrorist and na-
tional security measures can be found in other Latin American states.
Without apparent attention to human right conditions of necessity for
meeting "just requirements" in a "democratic society," Uruguay's Decree Law
No. 393/973 authorized the governmental prohibition of: "the publication,
by means of oral, written or televised media [of] all information, commen-
taries or impressions which directly or indirectly mentions or refers to those
persons who conspire against the nation or against antisubversive operations,
1"See N.Y. Times, March 13, 1977, at 18, col. 3. Marxist political parties were banned in
1973 when the military took over. See id.; Chilean Decree Laws, No. 77 (1973), No. 1009 (May
5, 1975). See also N.Y. Times, Dec. 4, 1977, at 13, col. 1 (seven labor leaders confined); N.Y.
Times, Sept. 6, 1977, at 6, col. 3 (4 Legislators held without trial).
117See N.Y. Times, Aug. 26, 1977, at 7, col. 1 (President); and N.Y. Times, March 13,
1977, at E4, col. 4 (judiciary).
1"See note 173 infra; N.Y. Times, Feb. 15, 1976, at 12, col. 1. These powers have been ex-
ercised. See N.Y. Times, Jan. 31, 1977, at 4, col. 4.
"'Articles 5-6, Decree Law, No. 1009 (May 5, 1975).
12See N.Y. Times, Feb. 15, 1976, at 12, col. 1.
12'See N.Y. Times, March 13, 1977, at 18, col. 3.
112It has been condemned four times by the United Nations for such violations. See
U.N.G.A. Res. (Dec. 1975); N.Y. Times, March 13, 1977, at 18, col. 3 (twice by the U.N.
Human Rights Commission); N.Y. Times, Dec. 17, 1977. at 9, col. 1. See also N.Y. Times, Jan.
5, 1978, at 12, col. 1 (International Commission of Jurists).
"'See also H. COOPER. TERRORISM AND THE MEDIA. supra note 110, at 149. Some inkling of
Allende regime violations is documented in Amnesty International, supra note 65, at 189-90.
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excluding official communication."' 24 Other Uruguayan decrees also seek to
curb any criticism of government measures taken against "terrorists"125 as well
as any public disclosure of the acts defined in the Military Penal Code as "Of-
fenses which Injure the Nation."' 26 Amnesty International lists at least thir-
teen journalists being held by the Uruguayan government. 27
Prohibitions of the public defense of acts categorized as a crime and/or a
person convicted of a crime can also be found among the laws of Paraguay"28
and Brazil. 29 Paraguay also prohibits public advocacy, by any means, of
"hatred among Paraguayans, or the destruction of the social classes;" the oc-
cupancy of public buildings as an act of protest; public insult of any of the
symbols of the state; and "calumny or defamation of the President, the Ex-
ecutive or Legislative Ministers, or the members of the Supreme Court."' 30
Bolivia prohibits oral or written matter that incites others to disobedience of
laws and resolutions of the government and any act or deed which interferes
with the realization of the development of the country."' Even our closest
Latin neighbor, Mexico, controls the importation of newsprint and indirectly
controls much of the newspaper and television media."32 It should not sur-
prise anyone that Cuba and Haiti do the same even more directly and to a
greater extent. Journalists are imprisoned in both countries."'3
Nicaragua has been ruled by the iron hand of the Somoza family for over
forty years."34 The United States Department of State report to Congress adds
"
4 Decree-Law No. 393/973 (1973). See also Uruguay Decree-Law No. 655/972 (Sept. 28,
1972).
"25See Uruguay Decree-Law No. 655/972 (Sept. 28, 1972) and Decree-Law No. 393/973
(June 19, 1973), art. 3. See also N.Y. Times, March 13, 1977, at E4, col. 4.
"'6See Uruguay Law No. 14,068, Article 148 (July 12, 1972) (Congressional legislation amen-
ding the Military Penal Code, which applies to everyone).
"
7See N.Y. Times, April 29, 1977, at 12, col. 3. It is also listed as "not free" by Freedom
House. N.Y. Times, Dec. 22, 1976, at 12, col. 2.
"28See Paraguay Law No. 209 (Sept. 18, 1970), art. 2. Paraguay is listed as "not free" by
Freedom House. N.Y. Times, Dec. 22, 1976, at 12, col. 2. Indeed, it has been under a state of
siege declared by Stroessner since 1954 and has a background of 150 years of military-based dic-
tatorship. See AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, supra note 65, 194-95. See also R. ARENS. GENOCIDE IN
PARAcUAY (1976); INTERNATIONAL LEAGUE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS. BULLETIN 2-3 (Oct. 1976).
"'See Brazil Decree Law No. 898 (Sept. 29, 1969), art. 47 (with greater penalties attached
when use is made of the press, radio or television). See also "Military in Brazil Plays By Own
Rules," N.Y. Times, Aug. 3, 1977, at 7, col. 1.
Amnesty International lists seven journalists imprisoned for political reasons, with some
other names omitted. See N.Y. Times, April 29, 1977, at 12, col. 3. A Brazilian press law also
forbids "publication of Amensty statements on Brazil." See AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, supra note
65, at 186.
"'S5ee Paraguary Law, note 128, supra, arts. 4, 6 and 7. See also AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL.
MATCHBOX 14 (Fall 1977) (9 lawyers, doctors and writers arrested).
"'See Bolivia Supreme Decree No. 10763 (March 12, 1973), art. 1, sec. H. Concerning
allegations of "systematic terror" against leftist opponents of the government and the use of tor-
ture, see AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, supra note 65, at 183-85.
"'See N.Y. Times, Nov. 24, 1977, at 7, col. 1.
"'See Amnesty International list, N.Y. Times, April 29, 1977, at 12, col. 3 (some others in
Cuba and Haiti are not publicly listed). See also AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL. supra note 64, at 179
and 190-91 (including a Cuban poet named Padilla).
11'See AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL. supra note 65, at 203.
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that Nicaragua has been under a state of siege since 1974, with the suspen-
sion of constitutional guarantees as well as censorship and harassment of the
press.155 Anti-terrorism provisions of the Penal, Code prohibit the threat of
harm "by means of correspondence, radio, telephone, telegraph, broadsheets,
figure drawings on walls, or elsewhere, or analogous means" for the purpose
of disturbing public order, or sowing or causing unrest in the land." 6 Also
prohibited is the explicit and direct incitement "to rebellion or sedition,
publicly or in the press . . . even though the rebellion or sedition does not
materialize."1 3 7 Further prohibitions include the joining of "Communist par-
ties, parties upholding Communist or similar ideas, or any internationally
organized party" as well as the assistance or participation in activities of such
parties, including the "preparation, printing, introduction, or distribution of
any propaganda into the country."" 8 In December of 1974, Nicaraguan
freedoms, such as they were, suffered new blows. A decree of martial law,
still operative, allowed the President to suspend any form of media "and
order the necessary measures to determine responsibility.""139
The Soviet Union
Not any less oppressive have been the media and free speech controls of
the Soviet Union. The government not only controls the media,. but owns and
operates newspaper, television and radio forms of news and communication.
One might suspect that such forms of direct control of speech and publica-
tion would be sufficient even for insecure security persons, even for a dic-
tatorship of "the proletariat," but apparently this is not the case. P.E.N.
describes the Soviet Union as the second leading offender (after Argentina
and just ahead of Chile) among states that persecute publishers and
writers. 140 The P.E.N. study lists seventy-eight writers as victims, with seven
as internees in work camps and twenty-two as prisoners in psychiatric confine-
ment in the Soviet Union and other East European communist countries.14 1
3'5 See N.Y. Times, March 13, at 1977, at 1, col. 2. The slaying of an anti-Somoza
newspaper editor (from "the country's only opposition paper"), while his civil rights has been
suspended by the government, raised suspicions of government-backed assassination and led to a
great public outcry as well as violence and terroristic responses. See N.Y. Times, Feb. 15, 1978,
at 7, col. 1; id., Feb. 1, 1978, at 3, col. 1; id., Jan. 13, 1978, at 1, col. 3; id., Jan. 11, 1978, at
3, col. 1. See also id., Feb. 24, 1978, at 10, col. 4 (soldiers prevent reporters from covering gun
battle).
136Nicaragua Penal Code, art. 499(d). This is an overly broad definition of "terrorists"
criminals. See Paust, Protection of "Non-Protected" Persons or Things, LEGAL ASPECTS OF INrER-
NATIONAL TERRORISM, forthcoming (A.S.I.L. 1978).
"'
5 Nicaragua Penal Code, art. 519.
1381d., art. 523.
1S'Martial Law Decree, art. 2(5) (Dec. 1974).
"
0 See N.Y. Times, Nov. 3, 1977, at 12, col. 3. See also McDougal. Lasswell & Chen, supra





In 1973 there were forty-six known cases of political dissidents being confined
to mental hospitals. 42
As Amnesty International notes, "[t]he psychiatric confinement of
dissenters was widely practised in the early 1950's ...Since 1965 .. . there
has been increasing evidence of the re-emergence of this practice."143 Further,
as the published list by Amnesty International in April, 1977 of over one
hundred journalists held discloses, one of the seven journalists detained in the
Soviet Union was imprisoned in a psychiatric hospital. 44
Other developments include the prevention of two Soviet human rights
activists, Vladimir Slepak and Anatoly Shcharansky (members of the group
"4See AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL. supra note 64, at 176. One such prisoner is Vladimir Ger-
shuni who was charged in 1970 under the Penal Code, art. 190-1, with "the distribution of
deliberately false fabrications discrediting the Soviet social and political system." Id. at 12. Truth
is apparently so important to the Soviets. During the pre-trial detention, Mr. Gershuni had been
diagnosed by state psychiatrists from the now infamous Serbsky Institute as a person of unsound
mind, no doubt because of his active support for human rights in the Soviet Union, which in-
cluded the signing of petitions and the writing of pamphlets, and his criticisin of the Soviet in-
tervention into Czechoslovakia and the continued imprisonment of Major-General Grigorenko, a
well known Russian dissident, in a mental hospital. See id. at 11-13. Mr. Gershuni's punishment
was thereafter ordered by the court-confinement to a mental hospital.
431d. at 175. The practice includes the use of drugs in an inhumane fashon and, in some
cases, physical torture. See id. at 13 and 175-78. Concerning more recent imprisonments of
dissidents in psychiatric hospitals, see also N.Y. Times, Dec. 21, 1977, at 6, col. 1. Amnesty In-
ternational also documents the case of a Kiev psychiatrist who criticized the diagnosis of a
political dissident. For his criticism, the doctor was sentenced in 1972 to seven years' strict im-
prisonment in a labor camp and three years in exile. See AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL supra note
64, at 177.
44See N.Y. Times, April 29, 1977, at 12, col. 3 (some names were omitted; so more might
be in mental hospitals).
The list of journalists did not include the case of Antoon Pype, a Belgian who distributed
political pamphlets at Leningrad University and who was sentenced to five years "strict regime"
imprisonment at a labor camp for "maliciously slandering" the Soviet Union and calling for a
change in the Soviet state system. See N.Y. Times, March 26, 1977, at 7, col. 2, pointing out
that the foreigner's use of the 1975 Helsinki agreement provisions for the freedom of speech and
the exchange of information were to no avail.
The list did not include" the names of Aleksandr Ginzburg and Yuri Orlov, who were ar-
rested in February 1977 for anti-Soviet slander and the monitoring of Soviet compliance with the
human right provisions of the 1975 Helsinki agreement. Orlov was given a seven year prison term
to be followed by five years of enforced residence for the crime of "anti-Soviet agitation." N.Y.
Times, May 19, 1978, at 1, co]. 2. The United States protested the decision. id. at 3, col. 3.
See N.Y. Times, March 16, 1977, at 10, col. 1; N.Y. Times, Aug. 3, 1977, at 4, col. 4, also
mentioning the questioning of a dissident poet, Valdimir Kornilov, and his prior expulsion (at
the time of the arrests of Ginzburg and Orlov) for publishing some of his words in the West. See
also N.Y. Times, Feb. 13, 1977, at 1, col. 4; INTERNATIONAL LEAGUE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS,
BULLETIN 4-5 (April 1976) (imprisonments of Kovalev, Tverdokhlebov and Plyusch in mental
hospitals and labor camps). Now Amnesty lists Orlov, the poet and novelist Rudenko, the writer
Gamsakhurdia, Ginzburg, Shcharansky and several others. Other Helsinki (human rights) watch
group members arrested include: V. Rtskhiladze, Z. Gamsakhurdia, M. Kostava. See N.Y.
Times, Jan. 28, 1978, at 3, col. 3. The list also excluded the writers and publishers of
underground newspapers and typewritten samizdat journals who have been sent to labor camps
or psychiatric institutions. See AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, supra note 65, at 12, 174; INTERNA-
TIONAL LEAGUE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, BULLETIN 6-7 (April 1976). See also INTERNATIONAL LEAGUE




that had included Ginzburg and Orlov) from speaking to a Los Angeles
Times reporter Robert Totht1 5 who subsequently called the incident a viola-
tion of the Helsinki agreement.146 Shcharansky was later arrested147 and a
soviet lawyer was expelled for trying to defend him. 19 Three months after the
arrest of Shcharansky, Toth was himself detained by the Soviets and question-
ed several days about his newspaper stories and contacts with the Ginzburg-
Orlov group, nine of whom then had been jailed. 14 8 Soon thereafter, a
sculptor was jailed who had honored the United States bicentennial, 14 9 and
another writer, of an underground book criticizing the Soviet detention of
political dissenters in mental hospitals, was ordered to leave the country.'50 So
fearful of human rights are the Soviet elite that even the United States Am-
bassador to the Soviet Union was prevented from delivering a traditional July
4th speech over Soviet television "after he declined to delete a section alluding
to the human rights policy of the Carter Administration."' 5' In fact, on
human rights day (December 10th) the Soviets confined twenty human rights
advocates to their apartments, cut off some of their phones, and took at least
four into custody, all in a vain attempt to prevent a silent demonstration in
Pushkin Square in Moscow.15 2
It is hardly conceivable that human rights to freedom of speech and
publication exist in the Soviet Union. Indeed, the control of speech and
thought are openly avowed aims of the party elites. Freedom of speech means
freedom of correct speech, s and even then several forms of media are direct-
ly controlled. Further, the Soviets are well known for their refusal to allow
foreign television, radio, books, newspapers and other forms of information to
flow freely across their borders.' 54 In an interrelated effort to assure control
141See N.Y. Times, March 16, 1977, at 10, col. 1; N.Y. Times, March 8, 1977, at 10, col.
3. Concerning the fate of Slepak, see also N.Y. Times, Nov. 26, 1977, at 7, col. 1.
'See N.Y. Times, March 8, 1977, at 10, col. 3.
147See N.Y. Times, June 16, 1977, at 8, col. 1; and N.Y. Times, Nov. 26, 1977, at 7, col. 4
(charged with treason).
14See id.; N.Y. Times, June 12, 1977, at 16, col. 1. Toth was subsequently released after a
U.S. intervention on his behalf. Later a Soviet lawyer was expelled from the country, apparently
for trying to defend Shcharansky. See N.Y. Times, Dec. 5, 1977, at 16, col. 4.
14'See N.Y. Times, June 17, 1977, at 10, col. 3.
"'OSee N.Y. Times, Dec. 3, 1977, at 4, cal. 5 (Mr. Podrabinek). He was later arrested while
trying to participate in a silent human rights protest with others. See N.Y. Times, Dec. I1, 1977,
at I, col. 4.
"'See N.Y. Times, July 5, 1977, at 1, col. 4. A portion of the bothersome speech read:
"Americans will continue to state publicly their belief in human rights and their hope that viola-
tions of these rights, wherever they may occur, will end." Id.
"52See N.Y. Times, Dec. 11, 1977, at 1, col. 4.
"'3See N.Y. Times, March 22, 1977, at 14, col. 1 (speech by Brezhnev); N.Y. Times, Feb.
13, 1977, at 1, col. 4. See also H. MARCUSE, SOVIET MARXISM-A CITICAL ANALYSIS (1961);
Zhukov, Fundamental Principles of Space Law, CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL LAw 274 (G.
Tunkin ed. 1969) (truthful information). See also N.Y. Times, Feb. 26, 1977, at 2, col. 6 (of-
ficial statement of Czechoslovakia, adding: "this right must be exercised solely in keeping with
the interest of the working people. . ."); I. DucHAcEK. RIGHTS AND LIBRTImS IN THE WORLD TO-
DAY: CONSTITUTIONAL PROMISE AND REALTY 175 (1973).
's4See, e.g., LEECH. OLIVER AND SWEENEY, THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM 299, 302-03
(1973); G. Zhukov, supra note 153, at 273-74; J. GREEN. THE UNITED NATIONS AND HUMAN
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of the will of the people, 55 the Soviet elites have been ardent advocates of an
international effort to change freedom of information rights through adop-
tion of severe restraints upon the activities of foreign news media persons.
From 1972, the Soviets have pressed for the approval by UNESCO of resolu-
tions recognizing state "responsibility" (and control) over the mass media
within state boundaries. 5 6 Although such efforts have been challenged by the
international press'5 7 and have not led to any formal resolutions, a 1976
working group within a UNESCO conference adopted a Soviet sponsored
draft. 58 The matter comes up again in 1978.
Although the Soviets are scarcely attentive to human right provisions of
the United Nations Charter, the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, 59 the 1966 Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 60 or the limita-
tions thereunder which are to be, under the circumstances, necessary to meet
the "just requirements" of a "democratic society," the Soviets do argue with
vigor that Article 2(7) of the United Nations Charter allows the party elite a
free hand to control its people and their thoughts. They are fairly clear about
their claim that although human rights are a part of "binding" law which
"must be granted and observed in all countries,' 6' the direct implementation
of human rights is an "internal affair" of the state, 62 although they often
RIGHTs 720 (1956); N.Y. Times, Aug. 3. 1977, at 4, col. 4; N.Y. Times, March 26, 1977, at 7,
col. 2. See also LEECH, OLIVER AND SWEENEY. supra at 132-33 (U.S. citizen jailed in
Czechoslovakia for Radio Free Europe activity).
'
55Dissenting views are dismissed from the "will" much like the justification offered in Prav-
da that opponents of socialism (e.g., human rights advocates) are "enemies" and "just a handful
of individuals who do not represent anyone or anything and are far removed from the Soviet peo-
ple." See N.Y. Times. Feb. 13, 1977, at 1, col. 4. See also N.Y. Times, March 22, 1977, at 14,
col. 1 (speech by Brezhnev). See also notes 137, 141 infra.
156See N.Y. Times, Dec. 22, 1976, at 12, col. 2; N.Y. Times, Nov. 23, 1976, at 6; col. 1;
N.Y. Times, Oct. 28, 1976, at 10, col. 1; N.Y. Times, July 1, 1976, at 3, col. 5; N.Y. Times,
Dec. 19, 1975, at 3, col. 3; N.Y. Times, Oct. 30, 1972, at 7, col. 1; cf., N.Y. Times, Nov. 30,
1976, at 2, col. 3. Much of the research on the Soviet proposals at UNESCO, for which I am
grateful, was provided by an Indiana student in my human rights seminar, Kurt Kaboth.
"
7See N.Y. Times, June 10, 1977, at 9, col. 1 (International Press Institute resolution urges
UNESCO to "adhere to UNESCO's own constitutional commitment to the free flow of informa-
tion"); N.Y. Times, Nov. 21, 1976, at 7, col. 1; N.Y. Times, July 1, 1976, at 3, col. 5.
'
55See N.Y. Times, Nov. 23, 1976, at 6, col. 1.
"5'Although the Soviets refused to vote for the Universal Declaration in 1948, they have
subsequently considered the Declaration to be a part of customary and Charter Law. See J.
CAREY, supra note 23, at 88, 130; I. BROWNLIE, BASIc DOCUMENTS ON HUMAN RiH-rrs 106 (1971);
Movchan, The Human Rights Problem in Present-Day International Law, in CONTEMPORARY IN-
TERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 153, at 235-37, 246 (principles of law secured in the Charter,
legal force not to be doubted, rule of law binding on all states, must be granted and observed in
all countries).
"'The U.S.S.R. is now a party to this treaty.
"6'See note 129, supra; G. TUNKIN, THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 79-81 (Harv. 1974)
(legal obligations and duties).
"1'See Movchan, The Human Rights Problem in Present-day International Law, in CONTEm-
PORARY INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 153, at 238-40, adding: "direct regulation of human
rights and freedoms . . . is an internal affair of this state..."; and Tunkin, supra note 161, at
82-83. See also notes 163, 164, and 171, infra.
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lack consistency in argument when they criticize others. Similarly, the Soviets
argue that the principle of self-determination allows Soviet elites the "right
to be complete masters in their own home."163 Thus, outside concern about
denials of human rights by the Soviet state, instead of being a matter of in-
ternational concern, is viewed by the power elites as an interference "in the
internal affairs of the Soviet Union"164 -the same attempt at justification of-
fered by so many violators of human rights of "the people."
Quite often the Soviet attempt at justification for state totalitarian con-
trols rests upon jurisprudential views inherited from the legal positivists of the
19th Century. 65 International law, for the Soviets, is the "will of states."166
Individuals are nearly irrelevant.167 Much like the followers of John Austin
(who might well have influenced Marx and Engels) or Hans Kelsen who at-
tempt to justify, as authoritative, the raw power exercised by governmental
elites in South Africa,168 Rhodesia,1 69 Uganda,170 and elsewhere, the Soviets
argue that:
The supremacy of the state means subordination to it of all persons and
organizations within the bounds of state territory.
The state has supreme power over all organizations and persons ....
All these . . . are bound to submit to it .... Only the will of the sovereign
state, expressed in state power, becomes a law. .... "
No wonder the Soviets press for more controls of the international media.
Such are the machinations of power elites who ignore or reject the standard
of authority proclaimed in Article 21 of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, the authority and will of the people.
"'3See Starushenko, Abolition of Colonialism and International Law, in CONTEMPORARY
INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 153, at 81. See also id. at 92; note 171, infra.
'See, N.Y. Times, March 22, 1977, at 14, col. 1 (speech by Brezhnev); note 162 supra.
'6"See also J.N. HAZARD. COMMUNISTS AND THEIR LAW 69-70 (1969) (positivism pushed to its
logical extreme); Paust, supra note 6, at 236.
'"See, e.g., G. Tunkin, Peaceful Coexistence and International Law, supra note 153, at 19,
32. See also id. at 164, 167, 175 (I. Lukashuk).
"'See A. Movchan, supra note 162, at 239-40.
'"8See notes 83-87 supra.
69See, e.g., Brookfield, The Courts, Kelsen, and the Rhodesian Revolution, 19 U. TORON-
TO L.J. 326 (1969); de Smith, Constitutional Lawyers in Revolutionary Situations, 7 WEST. ONT.
L. REV. 93 (1968).
1"This was the justification given by Dean A. Kiapi, of the Law School at the Makerere
University (Kampala, Uganda), during a speech at the University of Houston (April 26, 1976)
("Kelsen provides the answer"-i.e., the effective power is to be considered an equivalent of
authority).
"'See Ushakov, International Law and Sovereignty, CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL LAW,
supra note 153, at 99-101. See also id. at 102-03, 106-07, citing Hobbes, Spinoza and Hegel.
Ushakov might just as well have cited John Austin for these thoughts. See J. AUSTIN. THE
PROVINCE OFJURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED (1832). Here, however, there is no misreading of Kelsen
concerning his theory that international law supercedes such state power. See Ushakov, supra at
110 See also id. at 178.
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Other East European States
The patterns of oppression of free speech and publication identifiable in
the Soviet Union are, perhaps not too surprisingly, repeated in much of
Eastern Europe. Amnesty International has listed the names of nine jour-
nalists imprisoned for political reasons in Czechoslovakia, East Germany and
Yugoslavia.1 72 The 1977 United States Department of State country reports to
Congress disclosed the fact that in Yugoslavia, the only Eastern European
state receiving United States aid at the time, the government "consistently
violates certain rights, particularly those pertaining to critical political expres-
sion. 1 73
With the outspoken approval of more realistic dissent against state
deprivations of human rights and dignity by President Carter and the signing
of Charter 77 (a manifesto demanding broader freedoms) by many
Czechoslovakian human rights advocates,17 4 the Czech government apparently
felt the need to crack down on such nonsense. The crack-down was hard; the
anti-human rights campaign of February and March, 1977 in Czechoslovakia
left many dissenters dead or imprisoned. An official statement described the
manifesto as illegal and unconstitutional, since the formal constitutional right
to free speech "must be exercised solely in keeping the interests of the work-
ing people of Czechoslovakia" 75 -as defined by the controlling elites. Stress-
ing the communist theory of objective crime, the Communist Party newspaper
declared: "Regardless of whether they are politically naive or politically in-
sidious, they [the human rights advocates] are objectively playing a sorry role
in the actions of rabid anti-Communism. 1 76 Thereafter, at least twenty
signers of the Charter, including a radio commentator, were dismissed from
their jobs, 77 several others were imprisoned,178  one died during
'12See N.Y. Times, April 29, 1977, at 12, col. 3 (but some names from these countries are
omitted). Not listed were 3 persons imprisoned for spreading hostile propaganda and subsequent-
ly released (Djurovic, Veselica, Miklacic). See N.Y. Times, Nov. 25, 1977, at 2, col. 4. Also not
listed were the poet and writer Ignjatovic and his lawyer, Popovic, jailed for hostile propaganda
(in and out of court). See INTERNATIONAL LEAGUE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, BULLETIN 3-4 (Oct.
1976).
'"See N.Y. Times, March 13, 1977, at 1, col. 6. One such violation involves the conviction
of the democratic socialist writer Mihajlo Mihajlov for "spreading hostile propaganda" in articles
published abroad. See INTERNATIONAL LEAGUE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, BULLETIN 7 (April 1976). His
imprisonment is also reported by the the 1977 Amnesty International report, see note 172 supra.
Mihajlov was released on November 24, 1977 as part of an amnesty declared for 218 political
prisoners. See N.Y. Times, Nov. 26, 1977, at 6, col. 4; id., Nov. 27, 1977, at 7, col. 1. For this
he received a seven year sentence to be served in solitary confinement.
114See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Feb. 18, 1977, at 3, col. 2; N.Y. Times, Feb. 15, 1977, at 3, col.
1. Hundreds had signed the manifesto. See N.Y. Times, Feb. 6, 1977, at 5, col. 1. The
manifesto is reprinted at N.Y. Times, Jan. 27, 1977, at 16, col. 2.
'See N.Y. Times, Feb. 26, 1977, at 2, col. 6.
1"See N.Y. Times, Feb. 6, 1977, at 5, col. 1.
'7See N.Y. Times, March 23, 1977, at 8, col. 3.
'"See N.Y. Times, Feb. 26, 1977, at 2, col. 6; N.Y. Times, Feb. 18, 1977, at 3, col. 2. At
least 4 were journalists, playwrights or theater persons. See also N.Y. Times, March 16, 1977, at
2, col. 3 (arrest of playwright Havel and confinement of former Foreign Minister Hajek).
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interrogation, 17 9 and a foreign reporter was detained and questioned for
several hours concerning his contacts with the Czech human rights
advocates. 80 The government also passed Decree Law, No. 58, prohibiting
public criticism of the government by any Czech emigre while abroad and
placing anyone in jeopardy (e.g., family or friends) who maintains contact
with such an emigre. 181
It was, to say the least, a chilled late winter for human rights advocates
in the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia. Similar arrests occurred
in Rumania, apparently under a 1974 law that prohibits publications that
foster public unrest, violation of normal behavior or socialist morality, or
criticism of a foreign state. 8 2 In East Germany freedoms of speech and
publication apparently fare no better.18 3
West European States
There are few known actual restrictions on the media in Western Europe,
but several state constitutional or legislative provisions are potentially thwar-
ting of human rights to free expression. Exceptions include Turkey and
Spain. 184
In Turkey, the Constitution and Penal Code provide several types of bases
for press censorship and more general prohibitions of free speech. Under Ar-
ticle 22 of the Turkish Constitution, restrictions are possible "in the interests
of national security and public morale, in order to prevent offences against
the honour and the private rights of the invididual, or the soliciting of
punishable acts, and in order to ensure the proper exercise of judiciary
See Letter to the Editor from R. Sharlett, N.Y. Times, Nov. 22, 1977, at 36, col. 5 (on
death of former Philosphy Professor Jan Patocka).
18°See N.Y. Times, Feb. 16, 1977, at 5, col. I (West German reporter). A similar experience
was alleged by a U.S. reporter for the New York Times at about the same time. See N.Y. Times,
Feb. 18, 1977, at 3, col. 3; and N.Y. Times, Feb. 15, 1977, at 3, col. 1. An American reporter
was expelled for interviewing such persons. See N.Y. Times, May 2, 1978, at 11, col. 2.
'See R. Sharlett, supra note 179.
182See N.Y. Times, July 1, 1977, at 3, col. 4; N.Y. Times, Feb. 18, 1977, at 1. col. 2
(disclosing that at least one human rights advocate arrested was a novelist). See also N.Y. Times,
Nov. 25, 1977, at 2, col. 3 (The writer, Goma, now in exile, was held six weeks for participating
in the writing of open letters demanding political changes and charges that other are in jails,
labor camps and physhiatric hospitals for political reasons); INTERNATIONAL LEAGUE FOR HUMAN
RIGHTS, BULLETIN 8 (Oct. 1976) (sentence of dissident DeMetrescu and subsequent release);
Amnesty International, Matchbox [newspaper], at 9 (Fall 1977) (seven human rights protesters
jailed after sending a letter to President Carter).
'
85See N.Y. Times, Dec. 20, 1977, at 5, col. 3 (writers, poets, singer); N.Y. Times, Oct. 11,
1977, at 3, col. 2 (paper by Anmesty International disclosing severe restrictions on freedoms of
"movement, expression and association," censorship of the press, and the existence of thousands
of political prisoners); N.Y. Times, Aug. 25, 1977, at 11, col. I (arrest of party official for
publication of a book, THE ALTERNATIVE, critical of communist bureaucracy in the Soviet Union
and East Germany). See also Amnesty International, Matchbox [newspaper], at 9 (Fall 1977)
(release of 5 human rights protesters, including two songwriters and one writer).
'
4Concerning imprisonment and torture of media persons in Turkey, see N.Y. Times, April
29. 1977, at 12, col. 3; and AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, supra note 65, at 171.
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powers." Article 22 also provides detailed provisions concerning press sanc-
tions following censorship.185 Article 26 of the Constitution permits further
restrictions "for the protection of the territorial and national integrity of the
State," and Article 11 of the Constitution provides that no constitutional right
or liberty may be used with the intent to suppress human rights of others or
to destroy the territorial or national integrity of the state. There is, however,
no stated need for demonstration of the necessity of a restrictive measure in
order to serve the just requirements mentioned in relevant human rights in-
struments.
A recent report furnished by the government of Turkey discloses an even
broader set of criteria for control:
According to the information furnished in that report, Article 142 of the
Turkish Penal Code makes it a criminal offence to engage in communist,
fascist or racist propaganda or propaganda aimed at undermining or destroy-
ing national feelings, or to approve of such acts. Article 163 of the Turkish
Penal Code punishes any anti-laicist propaganda motivated by personal or
political interests which aims at establishing the basic order of the State on
religious precepts and convictions. Finally, Article 140 stipulates that anyone
is liable to punishment who, in foreign countries, "disseminates false, exag-
gerated or tendentious information on the domestic situation of the country
which is detrimental to her reputation or political influence or who, in
foreign countries, commits and other act detrimental to the national
interest. 8 6
We had better refrain from commenting on such.
The Spanish Constitution is potentially broader in its protection of the
state, for freedom of expression is guaranteed only "in so far as its exercise
does not interfere with the fundamental principles of the State. '18 7 Censorship
exists in Spain but it is apparently less severe than in prior years.188 Jour-
nalists are detained or imprisoned there for political reasons, 88 and on
several occasions the media has been ordered not to report at all about police
investigations into terrorist incidents and activities or government investiga-
tions into the practice of torture engaged in by state officials. 90
A 1975 Anti-terrorist Decree Law imposed severe penalties against anyone
who publicly defended or fostered outlawed idelogies (i.e., "Communist,
"'See also VIITH CONGRESS OF THE INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY FOR MILITARY LAW AND LAW OF
WAR, GENERAL REPORT, HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE ARMED FORCES: FREEDOM OF OPINION AND ExPRES-
SION 16 and 21 (1976).
1"Id. at 23. See also id. at 25, citing Penal Code, Article 161, applicable in time of war.
Turkey, it should be noted, adopts the unaccepted "passive personality" theory of jurisdictional
competence that would permit punishment of aliens for acts committed abroad.
"'.SPANISH CONsT. art. 12 (emphasis added).
"'See INTERNATIONAL LEAGUE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, BULLETIN 9 (Oct. 1976).
"'See N.Y. Times, April 29, at 12, col. 3; see also id., March'1, 1978, at 10, col. 1
(trial of actors in play for "insulting the armed forces").
"'°See N.Y. Times, Feb. 16, 1977, at 10, col. 5; N.Y. Times, June 18, 1975, at 9, col. 1.
On the practice of torture in Spain, see also AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, supra note 65, at 165-68.
1978]
INDIANA LA WJOURNAL
anarchist, separatist and other groups which advocate violence"); anyone who
declared "their approval" of or sought to justify "terrorist acts;" anyone who
praised "those committing such acts;" anyone who criticized the legal sanc-
tions punishing them; and anyone who sought "to diminish the independence
and prestige of the courts by means of demonstrations of solidarity with the
defendants."' 91  Terrorist suspects could be held incommunicado-thus
without the protection of the media-and the state could "suspend the
publication of materials and/or the right to exercise the profession of a
publisher, editor and news writer" for the types of support or criticism outlin-
ed above. 92 The press has since been ordered to remain silent in several in-
stances'93 and detainees can still be held incommunicado.
The Spanish government had defended its 1975 Anti-terrorist Decree Law
as one not dissimilar to those recenty enacted in France, Italy and the United
Kingdom and under consideration in the Federal Republic of Germany.' 94
Although it is no defense to violations of fundamental human rights that
there exist other state violators, Spain's assertion was, factually, too nearly
correct. Those countries do prohibit a free dissemination of information. For
example, Italy punishes offenses against "the personality" of the state as well
as the dissemination of "propaganda" for outlawed organizations. 9 5 Article
21 of the Italian Constitution also permits restrictions of expression and
public demonstrations that are contra bonos mores (against public morals).
Such has been interpreted to allow restriction on the basis of the protection of
the rights of others or overriding interests of the public weal, regardless of the
necessity for such restrictions. 96 Similar constitutional or penal restrictions
exist in France, 97 Belgium,19 8 Switzerland, 9 and Denmark.2 0 0 All prohibit
speech or writings used to solicit the commission of a criminal offense. 20
In the United Kingdom, the 1974 Prevention of Terrorism Act prohibits
several types of speech or conduct associated with free speech and/or the
"'Decree Law (Aug. 27, 1975), art. 10.
92See id., arts. 13 and 19. An estimated 500 government critics were apprehended within
the first six months of the implementation of the decree, but it was opposed by several segments
of the Spanish population, including the Spanish Bar Association, and the portions of the 1975
decree which directly muzzled the media were deleted in a revised anti-terrorist decree. See IN-
TERNATIONAL LEAGUE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, BULLETIN 8, (April 1976); and Spain Decree Law
(Feb. 6, 1976).
293See note 190 supra. Further, the Spanish government has suspended constitutional rights
from time to time by anti-terrorist decrees. See N.Y. Times, Jan. 29, 1977, at 1, col. 1.
194A.S.I.L. Summary of Domestic Law and Practice of Spain (Oct. 1975).
19sSee Italy Penal Code, arts. 4, 241 and 272. See also Austria Penal Code, art. 285 (cor-
respondence with a secret society). An Italian newspaper faces charges for having printed a Red
Brigade declaration. See N.Y. Times, May 23, 1978, at 8, col. 1.
"'See also note 185 supra, at 19, 21.
9'Id. at 19-20, citing arts. 10 and 11 of the Declaration of Human and Civic Rights.
"981d. at 24, citing Belgium Penal Code, art. 97.
11'Id. at 20.
200Id. at 19, citing Denmark Constitution, art. 77.
"'Id. at 22-23. See also id. at 20 (Belgium).
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freedom of association.20 2 Under Part I of the Act, criminal penalties can be
imposed after summary conviction on any person merely for professing to
belong to an outlawed organization; for solicitation of support for such an
organization; for arranging, helping to arrange, managing or addressing any
meeting of three or more persons knowing that the meeting is "to support or
further the activities of a proscribed organization;" or for wearing "any item
of dress" or wearing, carrying or displaying "any article in such a way as to
arouse reasonable apprehension that he is a member or supporter of a pro-
scribed organization. '" 20 3 Let the brightly dressed tourists bewarel Such is the
sad state of the rights of Englishmen in the 1970s.
In West Germany, the government apparently has not gone quite that
far, even after recent terrorist incidents and, what some have termed, a
resurgent anti-intellectualism and a conservative intolerance amidst the
stresses and uncertainties of this quarter century's economic difficulties.2 0 4
However, the West German Penal Code prohibits the dissemination of written
matter or use of the radio in order to "glorify violence" or to incite others to
racial hatred. 20 5 The West German Constitution also allows media restrictions
in order to protect the rights of others, including "the protection of youth"
and "personal honour," apparently without the human rights law need to
demonstrate the necessity for such action.206 Newer anti-terrorist measures
have banned communists and members of other groups agitating against the
state from teaching and certain civil service jobs, 20 7 and have also denied ter-
rorists in prison any access to their own attorneys. 208 There have also been
news "blackouts" concerning the anti-terrorist activities of the govenment. 20 9
What is as yet unknown is the reason why such overly broad restraints of fun-
damental human rights and freedoms, which are in no way related to the
standard of necessity within democratic process limits, have not been
202U.K. Prevention of Terrorism Act (1974). See also, Internees In N. Ireland To Get
Trials, Wash. Post, Sept. 22, 1972, at 1, col. 6. In 1971 the Special Powers Act of 1922 had also
been invoked to outlaw all demonstrations and prohibit certain forms of speech. See Wash. Post,
June 8, 1972, at 20. See also O'Boyle, Torture and Emergency Powers Under the European Con-
vention on Human Rights: Ireland v. the United Kingdom, 71 AM. J. INT"L L. 674 (1977).
2t3Part I, Prevention of Terrorism Act (Nov. 29, 1974). Although the only outlawed
organization is the I.R.A., the Secretary of State is empowered under Section 3 of Part I to ban
any organization that appears to be concerned with terrorism.
204See N.Y. Times, Oct. 23, 1977, at § 4, pg. 1, col. 2. Concerning the value-conservative
political effects of such, see also T. GURR. WHY MEN REBEL (1970) (addressing the problem in
terms of relative deprivation of values patterning); note 4 supra.
20 See F.R.G. Penal Code, § 131. The racial "hatred" provision might comply with the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 7.2065ee note 185, supra, at 20-21, 22 n.60, citing art. 5 of the German Basic Law (Constitu-
tion).
207See N.Y. Times, supra note 204 (the Forbidden Occupations Act of 1976).
2"See id.; see also N.Y. Times, Feb. 17, 1978, at 4, col. 4; N.Y. Times, Nov. 17, 1977, at
16, col. 1; N.Y. Times, Aug. 23, 1977, at 9, col. 1. Indeed, some 80 German defense attorneys
are charged with such crimes as "slander of the state" and "disrespect for the Court." See T.
Wicker, Law and Terrorism, N.Y. Times, Dec. 30, 1977, at A25, col. 5.
111 See N.Y. Times, Oct. 27, 1977, at 5, col. 1, disclosing that some German leaders
want even more controls on news and the media.
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challenged under the 1950 European Convention on Human Rights, through
the world's presently most viable international protection machinery. 2
10
The Peoples Republic of China
The governmental suppression of free speech and publication is so effec-
tive in China that little is known about actual arrests and restraints. As the
New York Times reports:
China is in many ways the most tightly controlled nation on earth. Part of
the explanation resides in the history of China, where the concept of in-
dividual freedom has alway been weak and the concept of social and political
conformity has been strong. Today, Communism has combined the confor-
mist tradition of the Chinese past with the techniques and organization of
modem totalitarianism to create a unique system for controlling people's
lives.
In a real sense, Chinese society itself is organized as a security system as
much as it is organized as an economic system or a social system. Every con-
stituent organization shares responsibility for security and control.
China imposes controls over areas of life that are matters of free in-
dividual choice even in other authoritatian countries and police states.211
In a very real sense, the re-education of the dissenter mentioned by Plato in
philosophic writings212 and implemented so well by Mao Tse-tung must add
to the controls and to our lack of knowledge thereof.21 3 Foreign reporters
have been expelled from China for writing about the problems concerning
human rights deprivations there, however, so we have some input. 21 4
South Korea And Other Asian States
North Korea has been described by Amnesty International as "a
thoroughly inaccessible country" 215 and by Le Monde as the "most closed
society in the world. '216 What we know about South Korea, which is describ-
ed by Freedom House as "partly free," 217 however, is appalling. South Korea
11 See 1950 European Convention on Human Rights, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 (1950), arts. 5-11;
N.Y. Times, Dec. 23, 1975, at 3, col. 1; N.Y. Times, Dec. 28, 1974, at 4, col. 3.14-15, 17,
19-60. See generally, L. SOHN. T. BUERGENTHAL, INTERNATIONAL PROTEcTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS
999-1265 (1973).
211 N.Y. Times, Oct. 11, 1977, at 2, col. 3. Freedom House lists China as "not free." See
N.Y. Times, Dec. 22, 1976, at 12, col. 2. See also AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, supra note 65, at
141; McDougal, Lasswell & Chen, supra note 4, at 4 n.8, 6 n.11; N.Y. Times, Dec. 23, 1975, at
3, col. 1; N.Y. Times, Dec. 28, 1974, at 4, col. 3.
21"See R. CUMMING, HUMAN NATURE AND HISTORY 163-64 (1969).
2"See also Literature of Dissent Rises in China, N.Y. Times, Dec. 13, 1977, at 1, col. 1,
disclosing cases of forced re-education and censorship and the fact that during the Cultural
Revolution all writings except Mao's were banned.
"4See N.Y. Times, Nov. 26, 1977, at 7, col. 1 (Canadian reporter).
2t1 See AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, supra note 65, at 144.




prohibits "anti-national" organizations as well as certain conduct potentially
thwarting of a free media, such as praising, encouraging or assisting anti-
national organizations.2 1 8 South Korea also punishes "[a] person who insults
or defames the envoy of a foreign country"21 9- another overly broad measure
potentially thwarting of free speech and publication. Perhaps-the broadest at-
tempt at communication control by decree is contained in the South Korean
Presidential emergency measure of 1975 which prohibits fabrication or
dissemination of any "falsehood," the making of any false presentation of
fact, or any public defamation of the emergency measures.2 20 Similarly broad
measures of media control for "social purification" purposes include bans on
certain music, certain words, and purportedly obscene T-shirts. 221
In South Korea, journalists and writers are imprisoned for political
reasons, 22 2 former or present political and religious leaders are imprisoned for
criticism of the government, 223 and human rights activists and lawyers who
criticize the government or demand freedom of the press and an end to the
persecution are themselves imprisoned or followed constantly by police. 224 In
South Korea, most of the arrests are made secretly "and all mention of them
[is] censored from the Korean press, television, and radio. ' 225 In my opinion,
then, it is hazardous to list South Korea as even "partly free" 226 and I serious-
ly question the long-term relevance to our foreign policy interests of our con-
tinued support of such a dictatorship.
Similarly, one must question the Freedom House listing of Indonesia and
the Philippines as "partly free. '227 At least twenty-one legislators are being
held in Indonesia without trial, the worst record in this instance.22s Indonesia
has an equally poor record with regard to imprisoned journalists, at least
twenty.229 Recently, Indonesian military officers ordered the closing of seven
212 See National Security Law (No. 549); Anti-communist Law (No. 643).
235See KOREAN PENAL CODE, Pt. II, Chpt. 4. art. 108(2).25 Korean Presidential Emergency Measure (May 13, 1975), arts. 1 and 4. See also N.Y.
Times, May 5, 1976, at 3, cal. 5; DIGEST OF UNITED STATES PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
1975 229-30 (E. McDowell ed. 1976).
221See N.Y. Times, Sept. 20, 1976, at 11, cal. 1. One of the "subversive" songs banned is
"We Shall Overcome."
22See N.Y. Times, April 29, 1977, at 12, col. 3; N.Y. Times, April 17, 1977, at 13, cal. 1
(poet and 4 journalists). See also McDougal, Lasswell, & Chen, supra note 4, at 8 n.18; DIGEST
OF UNITED STATES PRACTICE, supra note 220.
223See N.Y. Times, May 5, 1976, at 3, cal. 5; N.Y. Times, March 9, 1976, at 3, cal. 6.
224See N.Y. Times, April 17, 1977, at 13, cal. 1; N.Y. Times, March 1, 1977, at 4, cal. 3;
N.Y. Times, Sept. 5. 1974, at 14, cal. 1. See also, South Korean Students Protest Anew, N.Y.
Times, April 4, 1974, at 4, cal. 1; 12 Critics Sentenced in South Korea, N.Y. Times, March 3,
1974, at 9, cal. 1; South Korea Jails 2for 15 Years for Criticizing the Constitution, N.Y. Times,
Feb. 2, 1974, at 3, cal. 4; N.Y. Times, Jan. 9, 1974, at 3, cal. 1; N.Y. Times, March 1, 1978,
at 6, cal. 4; N.Y. Times, Feb. 22, 1979, at 8, cal. 4.525N.Y. Times, March 9, 1976, at 3, cal. 6.52"See also Cohen, Lawyers, Politics, and Despotism in Korea, 61 A.B.A.J. 730 (1975).
221See note 91 supra.
2"See 'N.Y. Times, Sept. 6, 1977, at 6, cal. 3.
229See N.Y. Times, Nov. 11, 1977, at 9, cal. 1; N.Y. Times, April 29, 1977, at 12, cal. 3.
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newspapers. 23 0 An official of the Association of American Publishers has
stated that Indonesian officials admit to some "750,000 arrests after 1965,
and those figures do not include the half million people officially estimated to
have been killed in reprisals after the unsuccessful coup." 23 1 The official adds:
In 1975 Indonesian Foreign Minister Adam Malik claimed that "only" about
20,000 political prisoners were still being held, but Amnesty International has
detemined that there are at least 55,000 . . . probably about 100,000.
As the former Indonesian Prosecutor General, Sugih Arto, explained to
foreign journalists in Jakarta in 1971, "Local commanders have the power to
arrest and interrogate any person under suspicion of being a threat to na-
tional security. These people can be held for an unlimited period [without
reporting] such security arrests to the central command in Jakarta." 2 2
In the Philippines the oppressive patterns are repeated, but to a lesser ex-
tent. 23S Journalists, legislators, religious leaders, and human rights advocates
who speak out have been imprisoned without trial-most of them since Presi-
dent Marcos proclaimed martial law in September 1972.234 Unfortunately,
freedom of speech and press is worse in much of Asia, including Vietnam,
Cambodia, Thailand, 2 5 Malaysia, 236 and Burma.231 Press restrictions and
political imprisonment of journalists also exist in Taiwan 28 and Singapore, 239
states that Freedom House lists as "partly free." 240
21°See N.Y. Times, Jan. 24, 1978, at 5, col. 5; N.Y. Times, Jan. 21, 1978, at 2, col. 2; In-
donesia is Keeping a Tight Rein on Press, N.Y. Times, April 23, 1978, at 17, col. 1.
21J. Laber, In Indonesia, A Writer's Plight, N.Y. Times, Nov. 19, 1977, at 21, col. 2. See
also AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, supra note 65, at 145-48; N.Y. Times, Dec. 16, 1977, at 7, col. 1
(warning that military may crush subversives).2 12d. Such numbers are confirmed at N.Y. Times, Dec. 21, 1977, at 9, col. 1.
233See Manila Aid Says 1, 441 Are Held in "Security" Cases, N.Y. Times, Feb. 19, 1977, at
2, col. 3, adding that nearly 8,000 had been arrested since 1972 in "security" cases. See also N.Y.
Times, April 11, 1978, at 5, col 1 (foreign press threatened); N.Y. Times, April 10, 1978, at 1,
col. 6.
214See Notes 228-29 supra; Activist Clergy Bear Burden of Arrests in the Philippines, N.Y.
Times, Nov. 12, 1977, at 2, col. 3; N.Y. Times, July 31, 1977, at 9, col. 1 (International Com-
mission of Jurists report denials of free speech and press, habeas corpus, and so forth); Amnesty
International, Matchbox 9, 15-16 (Fall 1977); DIGEST OF UNITED STATES PRA TICE. supra note
220, at 228-29; Marcos refers to his government as "constitutional authoritarianism." See Power
of Philippine Ruler Growing, N.Y. Times, Jan. 9, 1978, at 1, col. 5. A similar term is used in
Chile, see text accompanying note 207 supra.
235 See N.Y. Times, April 29, 1977, at 12, col. 3.
"
36See N.Y. Times, June 13, 1976, at 13, col. I (arrest of two editors for reporting news in a
slanted, unobjective, irresponsible manner). See also Emergency Ordinance of 1969, arts. 4 and
13; and the Essential (Security Cases) Regulations of 1975.
237See N.Y. Times, Oct. 7, 1977, at 8, col. 1 (press consorship as well as dictation as to
what to print). See also Burma Seditious Meetings Act, art. 4; BURMA PENAL CODE, art. 124B.
238See note 235 supra; N.Y. Times, June 27, 1977, at 9, col. 1; N.Y. Times, Nov. 29, 1976,
at 5, col. 1. See also AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, supra note 65, at 140 (under martial law for over
two decades); McDougal, Lasswell & Chen, supra note 4, at 6 n.12, 8 n.18.
239See note 235 supra; AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, Matchbox 5 (Fall 1977). See also AMNESTY
INTERNATIONAL, supra note 65, at 141, adding: "Throughout the 1960's and early 1970's the
Singapore government used political detention as an instrument for containing dissent."
245See note 45 supra.
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Further toward the west, freedoms of speech and press and the principle
of self-determination are similarly thwarted-now much more in Afghanistan,
Nepal and Pakistan than in India. India, however, suffered greatly under
Indira Gandhi's Emergency Proclamation of June 26, 1975, another overly
broad national security measure that suspended freedoms of speech and press
and led to the imprisonment of thousands.2 41 Such measures were denounced
by many as violations both of international human rights and domestic
law, 242 which might have contributed to Indira Gandhi's downfall.
As in so many cases, the normal judicial processes were halted under
power elite (the word is either "national" or "state") security measures. 243
Lawyers who were not jailed, in self-imposed exile, or in the service of the
state, as well as the more normal legal writs of habeas corpus, were rendered
politically and legally nugatory.2 44 Instead of human rights and international
standards of authority, "matters of state" and the "functioning of public ser-
vice and administration" conditioned the Indian Supreme Court decisions to
uphold government claims to control the Indian people and their thoughts.245
Courts easily fall in line when political leaders, journalists, attorneys and
others outside the judicial halls are imprisoned; but this court went a little
further. Not only did the Supreme Court refuse the writ of habeas corpus,
and thus exclude word from the imprisoned, but it also refused to see the
government's files on detainees who could not be charged with ordinary
crime: "[m]aterial and information on which orders of preventive detention
are passed necessarily belong to a class of documents whose disclosure would
impair the proper functioning of [the state as well as its] intelligence reports
2"See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Dec. 21, 1977, at 12, col. 1; N.Y. Times, Feb. 18, 1976, at 10,
col. 1; INTERNATIONAL LEAGUE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS. BULLETIN 1-2 (Oct. 1976); id., at 9-10 (April
1976); N.Y. Times, July 28, 1975, at 21, col. 1; N.Y. Times, June 27, 1975, at 12, col. 3; Nan-
da, From Gandhi to Gandhi-International League Responses to the Destruction of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms in India, 6 DEN. J. INT*L L. & POL. 19 (1976).
With the Indian Emergency Proclamation, there came the suspension of several human
rights and constitutional freedoms, including a ban on anti-government organizations, protest
marches and demonstrations, parliamentary elections (the word was "postponed"), the Press
Council, and freedoms of speech and press. See N.Y. Times, Feb. 18, 1976, at 10, col. 1; N.Y.
Times, Jan. 29, 1976, at 3, col. 1; N.Y. Times, Jan. 18, 1976, at 12, col. 1. In fact, at least thir-
ty members of Parliament were imprisoned, five U.S. journalists were expelled, two British jour-
nalists were expelled, and the Indian Information Ministry controlled the content of all
newspapers under a law that sought "the prevention of publication of objectionable matter" and
administrative "guidelines" to prevent criticism and "defamation" of Indira Gandhi and those
still in the government. See id.; V. Nanda, supra note 234, at 30-33.
242See supra note 234; and N.Y. Times, March 5, 1976, at 6, col. 4.
2"See Nanda, supra note 241, at 27-30; N.Y. Times, April 29, 1976, at 1, col. 5; N.Y.
Times, July 30, 1975, at 2, col. 1; N.Y. Times, July 24, 1975, at 1, col. 7. See also N.Y. Times,
Dec. 21, 1977, at 12, col. 1 (full judicial powers have not yet been restored).5 44See Nanda, supra note 241, at 25 and 28-30, noting, however, occasional outcries and
bar resolutions and the government's response: "even the families and relatives of such attorneys
were not spared police wrath."
245See id., at 29, citing Chief Justice Ray in one of the decisions.
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whose confidentiality is beyond reasonable question. " 246 That is how controls
are cemented and how courts abdicate their responsibility not only under
domestic law but under international law.
Professor Ved Nanda has also documented the extent to which decrees or
legislation in India prohibited speech. He writes that such measures pro-
hibited "any words, signs or visible representations considered defamatory ..
.[or] which are likely to '[b]ring into hatred or contempt or excite disaffection
towards the Government' . . . [as well as] 'any activity prejudicial to the in-
terests of sovereignty and integrity of India, security of the State, friendly
relations with foreign States, public order, decency or morality."' 247 One would
almost speculate that somewhere there exists a school for the learning of com-
parative approaches to repression. Also prohibited in the India versions was
publication of "opposition speeches in Parliament, details of court pro-
ceedings, names of detainees and their places of detention, demonstrations...
and matters critical of the government, ' 248 in response to which Professor
Nanda added: "This blanket of silence imposed on the Indian press and peo-
ple denies not only the freedom of expression but the concomitant right to
impart and receive information, a right basic to democratic society. 249
If Professor Nanda were writing about India's neighbor, Pakistan, the
same conclusions might well inescapably follow. Pakistan, so competitive with
India in many ways, also censures its media and imprisons its legislators, 25 0 its
journalists and critics. 251 Although the new military regime announced
recently that radio and television media were to be free from controls, pro-
government journalists were substituted for ousted pro-former-government
journalists in the government controlled group of newspapers.2 52 Additionally,
the government announcement noted that the electronic media were bound
"by Islamic ideology, national integrity and Pakistan's cultural values. '" 25 3
Two months later, some thirty journalists and newspaper workers were ar-
rested during a protest over the closing of an Urdu-language paper.2 54 Still
prohibited under the Prevention of Anti-National Activities Act is "anything"
that has "anti-national" effects, "whether by committing an act or by words,
2 4 61d. With this, compare the dangerous "national security" language of the Burger Court in
United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 706, 710-11 (1974) (opinion by Burger, C.J.); cf., id. at
707-09, 711-13; contra United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 219-20 (1882). See also note 8 supra.
"
71d. at 31-32.
'"Id. at 32.549Id. at 33. See also id. at 37-38 (flagrant violations not justified under human rights in-
struments as "strictly required by the exigencies" of a serious national emergency).
2"See N.Y. Times, Sept. 6, 1977, at 6, col. 3 (Pakistan is second only to Indonesia in pre-
sent imprisonment of legislators). See also N.Y. Times, March 1, 1978, at 6, col. 3 (political ac-
tivity blamed).
251See N.Y. Times, Dec. 8, 1977, at B6, col. 3; N.Y. Times, May 9, 1976, at 4, col. 1 (44
opposition persons charged with subversion, sabotage and terrorism). In 1978, twenty-two jour-
nalists and newspersons were detained. N.Y. Times, May 1, 1978, at 7, col. 6.
2"'See N.Y. Times, Aug. 21, 1977, at 11, col. 1.
25SId.
2"See N.Y. Times, Dec. 8, 1977, at B6, col. 3. See also note 251 supra.
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either spoken or written, or by signs or by visible representation or otherwise"
[tourists beware here as well], including the disclaiming, questioning or
disrupting of "sovereignty" and the expression of views "that the citizens of
Pakistan comprise more than one nationality. s"2 5 5
An anti-terrorist Pakistani Presidential proclamation empowered "special"
courts to try violations of the Anti-National Activities Act, as well as other
acts and rules, and placed the ultimate burden of proof on the accused to
show his innocence. 25 6 Another broad measure empowers the government to
make such rules as appear to it as necessary or expedient for ensuring the
security, public safety, public interest, or the defense of Pakistan. 251
The Middle East
Freedom House lists all of the Middle East except Israel as being either
"not free" or "partly free." 258" With such governmental conditions, it is not
surprising to read of the political imprisonment of journalists259 and curtail-
ment of press freedoms or open governmental control. 26 0 Apparently unique
to the region, however, is the abduction of foreign journalists from one Mid-
East country to another. 261 In Lebanon new government censorship, ad-
ministered directly by the National Security Agency, and bans on newspapers
that criticize new censorship decrees, publish false news or publish reports of
violence within Lebanon have changed Lebanon's reputation as the state with
the freest media in the Arab world. 262 The reputation of other Mid-East
states has not changed for the better. For example, Amnesty International
reports tight controls over criticism of the government in Iraq and Syria, 263
and, as an example of a similar prohibition, the Iranian Criminal Code pro-
scribes the use in public of "offending terms" against the Shah. 264
Even Israel, the most democratic state in the area, imprisons Arab
scholars and writers without charges or a trial. 26 Israel has detained Arabs
"'Pakistan Prevention of Anti-National Activities Act (1974).25Pakistani Presidential Ordinance to Provide for Suppression of Acts of Sabotage, Subver-
sion and Terrorism (Oct. 5, 1974).25 Defense of Pakistan Ordinance (1971).
258See N.Y. Times, Dec. 22, 1976, at 12, col. 2. See also AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, supra
note 65, at 205-17.
215 See N.Y. Times, April 29, 1977, at 12, col. 3 (Bahrain, Syria).
26°See N.Y. Times, July 16, 1977, at 5, col. 1 (Lebanon); N.Y. Times, July 5, 1977, at 4,
col. 1 (Lebanon); N.Y. Times, March 13, 1977, at 1, col. 6 (U.S. Dep't. of State report re:
Iran); N.Y. Times, May 25, 1978, at 7, col. 1 (Egypt); N.Y. TImes, May 22, 1978, at 6, col. 1
(Egypt).
26S1 ee N.Y. Times, Aug. 10, 1977, at 2, col. 3 (French journalist abducted in Lebanon and
taken to Syria).
2"8 See N.Y. Times, Jan. 12, 1978, at 6, col. 6; N.Y. Times, July 16, 1977, at 5, col. 1; N.Y.
Times, July 5, 1977, at 4, col. 3; N.Y. Times, June 6, 1977, at 13, col. 1, adding justifications
that the press was responsible for "fanning the Civil War"and "importing foreign ideologies."
2"See AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, supra note 65, at 210-11 and 217.
MI4 RAN CRIM. CODE, Sec. III, art. 81.
265See INTERNATIONAL LEAGUE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, BULLETIN 11-12 (April 1976). See also
Hassoueyn v. Minister of Defense, 31 JUDGMENTS OF THE SUP. CT. 272 (Case No. 126/59, Israel)
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for political and military reasons under inherited British Mandate Emergency
(Defense) Regulations, 266 regulations that prominent Israelis had previously
condemned. 267 The regulations also provide for censorship and restrictions
upon freedoms of speech and press. The actual military decisions made
thereunder are rarely reviewed by Israeli civilian courts-the reason: state
security. 268
Although Israel has allowed the publication of newspapers that are very
critical of Israel and governmental practices, 26 9 publication of any paper is
subject to license requirements under "paragraph 4 of the Newspapers Or-
dinance, a remnant of the British Mandatory government." 270 Under the or-
dinance, the Minister of the Interior can ban any newspaper publication "if
in his opinion it is likely to 'disturb the peace' or if it 'publishes false reports'
likely to cause alarm or despair," 21 very broad criteria that one finds in the
emergency decrees of several "not free" states. Military regulations also pro-
hibit the free importation of publications and provide for five years of im-
prisonment and/or fines in case of violation. 272 Also relevant to prohibitions
of free speech and press are the Israeli bans on certain political organizations
and the placing of individuals under "special supervision" and detention. 2"3
ALTERNATIVES TO GOVERNMENTAL CONTROL
The Role of the Judiciary
The Supreme Court decision concerning publication of the classified Pen-
tagon Papers makes it highly unlikely that the Court will allow broad
(forced residence imposed upon writer of a pamphlet seeking support of a political party). The
court refused to review acts of the military in the above case, as in many others. See note 268 in-
fra.
t 6British Mandate Emergency Regulations.
2
67See S. JIRYIs. THE ARAB IN ISRAEL. 1948-1966, 3-5 (1969). On Israeli practices, see, e.g.,
Shapiro-Libai, Libai, Freedom from Arbitrary Detention: Israel Law in Light of International
Law, 4 ISRAEL Y.B. ON HUMAN RIGHTS 335 (1974); Dershowitz, Preventive Detention of Citizens
During A National Emergency: A Comparison Between Israel and the United States, I ISRAEL
Y.B. ON HUMAN RIGHTS 295 (1971); Hadar, Administrative Detentions Employed by Israel, 1
ISRAEL Y.B. ON HUMAN RIGHTS 283 (1971). The U.N. General Assembly expressed "grave con-
cern" over such detentions. See U.N.G.A. Res. 3092B (XXVIII) (Dec. 7, 1973). See also AMNES-
TY INTERNATIONAL, supra note 65, at 211-14.
2"See, e.g., Ismail Ali v. The Inspector of Police, 7 JUDGMENTS OF THE Sup. CT. 913 (Case
No. 197/53, Israel); Subhi Al-Ayyubi v. Minister of Defense, 10 JUDGMENTS OF THE SUP. CT. 105
(Case No. 46/56, Israel); Hassoueyn v. Minister of Defense, 31 JUDGMENTS OF THE SUP. Cr. 272
(Case No. 126/59, Israel); Abu Hilu v. Govt. of Israel, 27 P.D. 169 (Israel 1973); Harnon,
Evidence Excluded by State Interest, 3 ISRAEL L. REv. 387 (1968). I am grateful to Sami
Jadallah, J.D. Indiana University, 1977, for research in this area.
5 S69 ee Stendel, The Rights of the Arab Minority in Israel, 1 ISRAEL Y.B. ON HUMAN RIGHTS
134, 148 (1971). See also M. Shamgar, The Observance of International Law in the Ad-
ministered Territories, 1 ISRAEL Y.B. ON HUMAN RIGHTS 262, 272 (1971). All news organizations,
however, are under military censorship. N.Y. Times, March 19, 1978, at 11, col. 1.
27"Stendel, supra note 269, at 148.
2711d. at 149; cf. Kol Ha'am Co. Ltd., 7 P.D. 871, cited id. ("reasonable likelihood" test,
emphasis added). See also Sabri Jiryes 18(4) P.D. 679, cited id. at 145.
2"2See id. at 442-43 (Importation and Distribution of Newspapers Order).
2"See id. at 144-47, 427-28; notes 265-67 supra.
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legislative and/or executive controls of the media such as those extant in far
too many foreign countries. In the Pentagon Papers case Justice Brennan
declared that only "proof that publication must inevitably, directly and im-
mediately cause the occurrence of an event kindred to imperiling the safety of
a transport already at sea can support even the issuance of an interim
restraining order. '274 In another Supreme Court case, Justice Black also
stressed the need for open criticism of governmental officials and agencies
"[b]ecause of the very nature of or democracy," adding that "[g]overnment
censorship can no more be reconciled with our national constitutional stand-
ard of freedom of speech and press when done in the guise [of an indirect
measure] than if it should be attempted directly." 275 Additionally, it has been
declared that the "basis of the First Amendment is the hypothesis that speech
can rebut speech, propaganda will answer propaganda . . ."276 More directly
relevant to the survey of foreign trends in human right oppression and the
dangers posed to our own society, however, are the words of Justice White:
We have learned, and continue to learn, from what we view as the
unhappy experiences of other nations where government has been allowed to
meddle in the internal editorial affairs of newspapers. Regardless of how
beneficent-sounding the purposes of controlling the press might be, we . . .
remain intensely skeptical about those measures that would allow government
to insinuate itself into the editorial rooms of this Nation's press. 277
Nevertheless, in our constitutional history there are judicial expressions so
overly broad in their permission of state control of the media as to serve the
interests of totalitarians and obviate the shared meanings of freedom of
speech and democracy. One such case, one that could have been cited by
power elites in South Africa or South Korea, is Gitlow v. New York. 278 In
Gitlow, the Court stated: "That a State in the exercise of its police power
may punish those who abuse this freedom by utterances inimical to the public
welfare, tending to corrupt public morals, incite to crime, or disturb the
public peace, is not open to question." 279 I must question such criteria for
control however, for these very standards are far too ill-defined, too broad for
"'New York Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 727 (1971) (Brennan J., concurring).
275Konigsberg v. State Bar, 353 U.S. 252, 269 (1957) (Black, J.). See also New York Times
v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 719 (1971) (Black, J., concurring) id. at 730-31 (Stewart &
White, JJ., concurring); id. at 723 (Douglas, J., concurring); Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214,
218-19 (1966); Near v. Minnesota 283 U.S. 697, 719-20 (1931) (Hughes, C.J.); International Pro-
ducts Corp. v. Koons, 325 F.2d 403 (2d Cir. 1963) (criticism of foreign officials protected).
"'Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 503 (1951); cf., Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S.
753 (1972).
2"Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 259 (1974) (White, J., concurr-
ing), quoted in Nebraska Press Assoc. v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 560-61 (1976).




the maintenance of a free competition of ideas, criticism of governmental
officials and their actions and a free flow of information which is needed
for rational decision and the process of authority whereby the will of the peo-
ple is informed, shaped and expressed. Words such as "inimical to," "tend-
ing," and "disturb" are so obviously broad as potentially to allow the sorts of
totalitarian controls of music, speech and press that one finds, for example,
in South Kbrea or the Soviet Union. Further, such overly broad criteria would
not meet the test for permissible state derogations of human rights to free
speech and press that one finds some twenty-three years after the court opin-
ion was written in the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The test
there is necessity within democratic limits, not things "tending," things that
"disturb" or things "inimical." Although "just" and "strict" requirements
might relate to the same type of public concerns mentioned in Gitlow (e.g.,
general welfare, morality and public order),280 the degree of public danger
that authorizes restrictions on the individual must be so high as to pose a
"just requirement" or "strict requirement" under the circumstances-some-
thing even beyond "clear and present danger." 21
Similarly, a "compelling" interest 282 may hardly be the same as a "just"
and "strict" requirement under specific circumstances. Although dangers to
"compelling"' interests may be more important than dangers to any sort of in-
terest, neither might necessitate action or pose such a clear and present
danger that measures of restraint are justly required. More compatible with
the human rights standard are other qualifying words of the Supreme Court.
For example, in Brandenburg v. Ohio2 8 3 the Court pointed out that mere ad-
vocacy of violence is permissible, that there must be advocacy "directed to in-
citing or producing imminent lawless action" and it must be likely that such
action will result before permissible restraints may be imposed. 284 In Dennis
v. United States, language also appears that supplements either a necessity or
"imminent lawless action" test. 285 Several other cases add a related qualifica-
tion that is somewhat akin to the human rights "strict requirement" test, for
the courts have declared that prior restraints of free speech "cannot be
"'S$ee, e.g., 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 29(2); 1966 Covenant on
Civil, and Political Rights, arts. 4(1), 18(3), 19(3); cf. art. 20 (incitement to violence).
2 1See, e.g., Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
1'8 See, e.g., Lewis v. Baxley, 368 F. Supp. 768, 778 (M.D. Ala. 1973), citing Branzburg v.
Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 770 (1972), and other cases.
258395 U.S. 444 (1969). See also note 274 supra.
"
5 id. at 447.
258 See note 276 supra, at 510 ("as is necessary to avoid the danger"), citing Judge Hand, 183
F.2d 212; and id. at 585 ("must be some immediate injury to society . . .", Douglas, J., dissen-
ting); contra id. at 581 ("the teaching of methods of terror and other seditious conduct should be
beyond the pale," Douglas, J., dissenting). The "necessary to avoid the danger" test was also cited




upheld if reasonable alternatives are available having a lesser impact on first
amendment freedoms." 286
Furthermore, in consideration of the interests at stake and which relate to
the necessity of "imminent lawless action" tests, "governmental" interests28 7 as
such should never be confused with the "just requirements of morality, public
order and the general welfare in a democratic society." These are not
simplistically always the same. For these and similar reasons, I cannot accept
the claim that "incitement to violence" is always a justification for govern-
mental control of the media when violence is imminent. Contrary to certain
case language,2 8 the problem demands, like so many others, an awareness of
all relevant features of context and all legal policies at stake.28 9 In certain
contexts, violence may be necessary to oppose a tyrant or an oppressive
government. 290 As President Abraham Lincoln said even in the midst of civil
war: "This country, with its institutions, belongs to the people who inhabit it.
Whenever they shall grow weary of the existing government, they can exercise
their constitutional right of amending, or their revolutionary right to
dismember or overthrow it."291 Indeed, state constitutions within the United
States consistently recognize the right of the people "to reform, alter, or
abolish government" in any way they so desire. 292 Violence engaged in by the
predominant majority of a society for such purposes could be constitutionally
permissible and thus not "lawless" within the meaning of Brandenburg.293
A final comment on the judiciary concerns the three general methods
whereby international legal standards, such as the right to freedom of speech
and press and the standard of "just" and "strict" requirements within
democratic limits, are incorporable under constitutional law. The three
methods of incorporation are: (1) direct incorporation of human rights law as
28'See, e.g., CBS v. Young, 522 F.2d 234, 238 (6th Cir. 1975), citing Carroll v. Pres. &
Comm. of Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175, 183 (1968); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488
(1960).
"'For evidence of use of "governmental" interests, see note 282 supra; Paust, supra note 6,
at 243.
2
"See Cole v. Richardson, 405 U.S. 676, 686 (1972); Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494,
501, 509 (1951); cf. Brocks v. Auburn University, 296 F. Supp. 188, 193, 195 (M.D. Ala.), affd,
412 F.2d 1171 (5th Cir. 1969).26See also McDougal, Lasswell & Chen, supra note 4, at 15.29OSee, e.g., In re Anastapol, 366 U.S. 82, 113 (1961) (Black, J., dissenting), citing CHAFEE.
FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 178 (1942). See also American Comm. Ass'n v. Douds, 339
U.S. 382, 439-43 (Jackson, J., concurring & dissenting); Cole v. Richardson, supra note 288, at
688 (Douglas, J., dissenting), citing Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969); Noto v.
United States, 367 U.S. 290, 297-98 (1961); and Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 318
(1957); Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 599-602 (1967); De Jonge v. Oregon, 299
U.S. 353, 365 (1937).
29'First Inaugual Address, LINCOLN'S STORIES AND SPEECHES 212 (E. Allen ed. 1900), cf. id.
at 209-10.
292See Paust, supra note 6, at 243 n.36, 262 (right of revolution). See also DECLARATION OF
INDEPENDENCE (1776); DECLARATION OF THE CAUSES AND NECESSITY OF TAKING UP ARMS (1775).293See also supra notes 290-92; and J. PAUST & A. BLAUSTEIN. WAR CRIMES JURISDICTION AND
DUE PROCESS: A CASE STUDY OF BANGLADESH (1974).
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supreme law of the land under article VI, clause 2 of the United States Con-
stitution, with use of judicial precedent like The Paquete Habana case;294 (2)
indirect incorporation of human rights law as part of relevant standards
useable by judicial and other decision-makers confronted with the task of in-
terpreting the specific content of amendments to the Constitution (such as the
first, fifth or eighth amendments); and (3) mirrored, equivalent incorporation
of human rights law as reflective of a part of the relevent constitutional rights
of all persons that are retained under the ninth amendment to the United
States Constitution. An awareness of the rich and complex interpenetrations
of international and domestic legal processes is critical to an adequate ap-
proach to decision about free speech and press and the values of human
dignity. Furthermore, awareness of the ways in which international legal stan-
dards are integrated into domestic law will allow the courts to pattern their
decisions in accordance with global expectations. In particular, courts can
discover and utilize the preferred necessity within democratic limits test when
confronted with state claims to derogate from the human and constitutional
right to free speech.
Human rights are guaranteed in international law through several inter-
national treaties as well as general norms of customary law. The most signifi-
cant treaty guarantee is found in the United Nations Charter which, itself, is
a part of the treaty law of the United States. 295 Since the United Nations
Charter contains the express pledge of the United States to establish respect
for and observance of human rights, this obligation is itself a part of the
supreme law of the land through article VI, section 2, of the Constitution. 296
Thus, whether through the ninth and other amendments to the Constitution
or through the United Nations Charter and article VI, section 2, United
States governmental bodies must respect and ensure respect for fundamental
human rights whether or not specific human right treaty provisions or specific
human rights implementary legislation exist. 29 7 Since these constitutional
294175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900).
2'158 Stat. 1035 (1945).
216See U.N. CHARTER, preamble and arts. 1, 2, 55(c) and 56.
217Cf., Paust, Constitutional Prohibitions of Cruel, Inhumane or Unnecessary Death, Injury
or Suffering During Law Enforcement Process, 2 HASTINGS CONsT. L.Q. 873, 886-87, n.50
(1975). See also People of Saipan v. U.S. Dept. of Interior, 502 F.2d 90, 96-99 (9th Cir. 1974),
cert. denied, 420 U.S. 1003 (1975); Diggs v. Shultz, 470 F.2d 461 (1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S.
931 (1973); Wilson v. Hacker, 101 N.Y.S.2d 461, 472-73 (1950); Namba v. McCourt, 185 Ore.
579, 604 P.2d 569, 579 (1949) contra Hitai v. Immigration & Naturalization Service, 343 F.2d
466, 468 (2d Cir. 1965). See also Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327, 343 (1977) (Brennan, J. dissen-
ting).
It can also be argued that the 1964 Civil Rights Act implemented general human rights
law, since human rights are protected by art. VI, cl. 2 and the ninth amendment and are,
thus, part of federal and constitutional law. In this regard, it is also significant that a Senate
committee, during hearings on an alternative draft of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, seemed intent
on implementing the human rights provisions of the U.N. Charter through the legislative pro-
posal before the committee. See statements of Senator Prouty and Secretary of State Rusk, S.
Res. 1932 (88th Cong., 1st Sess.) 1963, Hearings before the Committee on Commerce, 88th
Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 26, pt. 1, at 282, 307 (1964). See also Heart of Atlanta Motel v. U.S., 379
U.S. 241, 291 (1964) (human dignity purpose).
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amendments and relevant treaty provisions are also binding on state and local
governmental bodies, 298 it is evident that decision-making with respect to
questions of human dignity must address the need for rational decision that
seeks to serve general legal policies at stake and considers all of the relevant
community and individual interests.
Not only must state decision-makers address and yield to the policy or
provisions of "a treaty or of an international compact or agreement" when a
national interest is demonstrated and the policies at stake do not impair fun-
damental Constitutional rights or powers, 299 but state decisions which stand as
a barrier to the fulfillment of our national pledge in the United Nations
Charter to promote respect for and observance of human rights and fun-
damental freedoms for all must be condemned and struck down by the
courts.300 Moreover, as declared in Asakura v. City of Seattle, the Supreme
Court will strike down any state laws or municipal ordinances which conflict
with international treaty law. 3 0 ' The Supreme Court also held that interna-
tional treaty law "stands on the same footing of supremacy as do the provi-
sions of the Constitution and laws of the United States. It operates of itself
without the aid of any legislation, state or national; and it will be applied
and given authoritative effect by the courts." 30 2 Further, as the Supreme
Court declared in The Paquete Habana:
"'sSee, e.g., Griswold v. Conn., 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660
(1962); Rochin v. Calif., 342 U.S. 165 (1952); and Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920).
2s1See U.S. v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942); Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920).
3 00Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633, 673 (1948) (Murphy & Rutledge, JJ., concurring). See
also id. at 649-50 (Black & Douglas, JJ., concurring); United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 230-31
(1942), adding: "state law must yield when it is inconsistent with or impairs the policy or provi-
sions of a treaty or of an international compact or agreement" (emphasis added); Hines v.
Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941); United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324 (1937); Nielsen v.
Johnson, 279 U.S. 47 (1929); Asakura v. City of Seattle, 265 U.S. 332 (1924); Missouri v.
Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920); Haustein v. Lynham, 100 U.S. 483 (1879); Fairfax's Devisee v.
Hunter's Lessee, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 603 (1812); and Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (Dall.) 199 (1796).
The only case to the contrary was a California decision made in an aura of noted racial hysteria;
Sei Fujii v. Calif., 38 Cal. 2d 718, 242 P.2d 617 (1952). The Sei Fujii decision is not only con-
trary to every relevant U.S. Supreme Court decision but is highly controversial and, in the opi-
nion of this author, incorrect. See Paust, supra note 6, at 233. Further, in direct conflict with
the statement in Sei Fujii that certain treaty provisions are not "self-executing" and require im-
plementing legislation at the federal level before they become part of the supreme law of the
land was the holding in Asakura v. City of Seattle, supra that a treaty for the protection of cer-
tain persons "operates of itself without the aid of any legislation, state or national; and it will be
applied and given authoritative effect by the courts." See also The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S.
677 (1900); Strother v. Lucas, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 410, 438 (1838).
-1265 U.S. 332 (1924).3 11d. See also Maiorano v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 213 U.S. 268, 272-73 (1909), stating: "A
treaty . . . is the supreme law of the land, binding alike National and state Courts, and is
capable of enforcement, and must be enforced by them in the litigation of private rights;" The
Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900); Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 27-28 (1942) (private
rights); Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163 (1895) (private rights); Head Money Cases (Edye v.
Robertson), 112 U.S. 580, 598-99 (1884) (private rights).
In case of conflict with a Constitutional Amendment, however, treaty law must yield to the
Constitution in domestic legal process. See Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1957); Asakura v.
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International law is part of our law, and must be ascertained and ad-
ministered by the courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction as often as
questions of right depending upon it are duly presented for their determina-
tion. For this purpose, where there is no treaty and no controlling executive
or legislative act or judicial decision, resort must be had to the customs and
usages of civilized nations, and, as evidence of these, to the works of jurists
and commentators who by years of labor, research, and experience have
made themselves peculiarly well acquainted with the subjects of which they
treat. Such works are resorted to by judicial tribunals, not for the specula-
tions of their authors concerning what the law ought to be, but for trustwor-
thy evidence of what the law really is.303
The human right of all persons to freedom of speech are such matters of
right. As the author has explained elsewhere, 30 4 recognition of the direct in-
tegration of human right standards for judicial decision-making will
guarantee more adequately both the fulfillment of our international obliga-
tions and the effective implementation of Constitutional rights.
Human rights standards have been utilized by the Court in numerous
decisions. Quite often an indirect incorporation of human rights law into con-
stitutional law has occurred through use of human rights as relevant stan-
dards of constitutional right and rights content. Thus, human rights law has
been utilized either to identify the existence of rights guaranteed within the
first nine amendments to the Constitution or, as an interpretive guide, to
identify and clarify the more detailed content of extant constitutional rights.
As disclosed in other writings,3 0 5 the Court has also utilized broader
criterial referents to generally shared legal expectation; for example:
something "universally thought, '" 30 6 a dynamic and "universal sense of
justice," 307 the unanimity of civilized nations of the world,3 0 8 and the interna-
tional "custom of war. " 30 9 The utilization of international laws of war and
human rights is not at all unusual, since a basic expectation of the Founding
Fathers had been that the Rights of Man are to be protected under the Con-
stitution,310 and it is a truism that universal rights must necessarily be our
own. Moreover, there is often useful detail or specificity under these interna-
tional standards. It is not unlikely that a court seeking guidance and a ra-
City of Seattle, 265 U.S. 332 (1924); Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258, 267 (1890); The Cherokee
Tobacco, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 616, 620-21 (1871); Doe v. Braden, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 635, 657
(1853).
'O°Supra note 294. See also supra note 302; Coleman v. Tenn., 97 U.S. 509, 517 (1878);
The Nereide, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 388, 420 (1815); Talbot v. Janson, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 133, 160
(1795) (Iredell, J., concurring); Respublica v. De Longchamps, 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) 111 (1784).
"
5
'See notes 6, 30, and 297 supra.
"'
5See note 297 supra.
"
56See Robinson v. Calif., 370 U.S. 660, 666 (1962).
507See Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 462 (1942).
508Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 102 (1958).
"'See Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130, 134 (1879). See also Declaration of Independence
(1776) and Declaration of the Causes and Necessity of Taking Up Arms (1775).
351 See Paust, supra notes 6 and 30.
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tional approach to the serving of inherited expectations and basic legal
policies would utilize international legal standards to determine the generally
shared expectation about "cruelty," "inhumanity" or "human dignity" which
can provide legal content to such phrases. This seems especially so when the
same word or phrase is used in both international law and domestic legal pro-
cess, there is a long history of such a usage, and the uniform opinio juris of
humankind is quite clear.
It should be as self-evident now as it was in 1776 that human rights must
necessarily be our own. Indeed, to Jefferson, Paine, Madison and others,
these rights were fundamental to the process of authority and "what the peo-
ple are entitled to against every government on earth . . ."31 But if these
Rights of Man (human rights) were not specified with particularity in the
Constitution, how were they to be incorporated into the constitutional
framework of powers, rights and fundamental policies? In another article, 31 2
the author concludes that human rights law is part of our law through
specific enumerations of right or policy and through the explicit guarantee of
retained rights in the ninth amendment, which states that "[t]he enumera-
tion in the Constitution of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or
disparage others retained by the people."
Documented human rights are sufficiently particularized to give more
detailed and useful content to expressions that our courts do not hesitate to
use, such as "the traditions and collective conscience of our people" or a
.universal sense of justice."313 Human rights are not only perceived by many
to be among the fundamental expectations that the courts should address,
but they provide greater guidance for rational and policy-responsive decision-
making. Moreover, our society arose under Natural Law expectancies of the
existence of universal Rights of Man-rights that could exist even though they
were not printed somewhere with black and white particularity. Today, with
an improved articulation of the nature and content of the Rights of Man, it
is far easier for our courts to make empirical inquiries into the actual boun-
daries of rights content and to identify the existence of general rights that are
nowhere enumerated specifically within the Constitution. With the develop-
ment of human rights law, then, there is a rich field of basic human legal ex-
pectation which is ripe for judicial discovery and use.
Furthermore, when utilizing basic human rights law to supplement re-
tained rights of our people under the ninth amendment the courts will not
only be performing a more rational, objective decisional task than the use of
phrases such as "traditions and collective conscience" or a "universal sense of
"'
1See IV WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 477 (Ford ed. 1894). See also note 297 supra.
S'ZSupra note 6. See also Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304
U.S. 458, 462 (1938); Karr v. Schmidt, 460 F.2d 609, 620 (5th Cir.) cert. denied, 409 U.S. 989
(1972).
"'
3See also note 6 supra; Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Reswebar, 329 U.S. 459 (1947); People
of Saipan v. U.S. Dep't of Interior, 502 F.2d 90 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 1003
(1975); Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1924).
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justice" seems to suggest,314 but the courts will be performing a proper
judicial function-the discovery and interpretation of fundamental rights of




Although very few writers have addressed the problem of media roles in
response to terrorism, all known writings recognize the special problem of
media sensationalism, advertisement and propagation of terrorism. All writers
'also recognize a special responsibility of the free media to avoid being unduly
manipulated by terrorists and contributing too much to the undesirable ef-
fects of terrorism; but all stress, significantly, that the media must be free
from governmental control. Governmental censorship is uniformly condemn-
ed.
Perhaps exemplifying all writings to date is the Final Document of a
private Conference on Terrorism and Political Crimes held in 1973 in Italy.
Relevant portions of the document read:
1. The problem of sensational press reports concerning terrorism, which en-
courage and promote future terrorism, suggests that the mass media has the
responsibility of exercising restraint in this regard.
2. Recognizing the basic human rights to free speech and freedom of infor-
mation, and condemning any attempts at censorship, it is nonetheless
necessary that the mass media establish guidelines and procedures for reports
on terrorism and violence.
3. Consideration should be given by the mass media to the establishment of
a press council or council of editors, representing all forms of mass media,
which would meet periodically to regulate this problem. (Such a procedure is
presently employed in certain countries).3 16
One of the conference participants, Franco Salomone, presented a paper on
terrorism and the media. The paper pointed out that newspapers and other
printed media may pose fewer problems with regard to actual sensationalizing
and shock effects as compared to the effects of electronic media (e.g., radio
and television), since the printed media reaches fewer members of any given
populace and often reaches them after terrorist events have become known
through the electronic media.31 7 Such a fact might lead to certain distinctions
in media responsibility and responses, but Salomone was unwilling to explore
314See also Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459 (1947); and Rochin v. Calif.,
342 U.S. 165, 169-70 (1952). For evidence of a related jurispurdential point, see also Irvine v.
Calif., 347 U.S. 128, 147 (1954) (Frankfurter, J.).
315See note 6 supra.316Reprodueced in M.C. BAssIOUNI (ed.) INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM AND POLIrICAL CRIMES
XIV-XV (1975).317See id. at 43-44. See also C.B.C v. Mitchell, 333 F. Supp. 582, 584 (D.C. 1971), affd
sub. nom., 405 U.S. 1000 (1972); United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131 (1948)
concerning possible distinctions in treatment of the media.
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the matter further. In fact, he rightly pointed out that in order to decide
these and similar questions "we must have some empirical data to indicate
among other things the degree to which any restrictions on the mass media
are likely to have a beneficial effect on the control of terrorism.1'3 1 He add-
ed: "There is no data on this point and therefore it is difficult to propose any
plan on the basis of untested if not uncertain assumptions."3 19 All the more
reason exists, therefore, to avoid deprivations of human rights to free speech
and press.
With regard to media standards, Salomone felt that these should be
voluntary, developed by the media in cooperation with "competent govern-
mental agencies and public interest groups," and implemented through the
media.3 10 A similar approach was advocated by the editor of the conference
document, Professor Cherif Bassiouni, Attorney Clarence Mann and myself
during a two-year study of responses to terrorism by members of a working
group of the American Society of International Law. Within the published
results of the A.S.I.L. study, Clarence Mann pointed out several relevant con-
cerns that "deserve more attention by the media in establishing professional
guidelines for the industry as a whole," but seemed to emphasize what
generally became a working group consensus-that "what is 'newsworthy'
must remain within the good judgment of editors and reporters. .. "321
The problem, Mann suggests, is a difficult one considering the many
competing needs, the fact that the "news media has no set policy for repor-
ting terrorist incidents," and the fact that "there can be no simple formula
for determining appropriate media response" in the multifarious instances
that might arise.322 Indeed, the competing interests at stake in any given con-
text may be so tightly intertwined that simple solutions will become useless,
even dangerous. As Mann suggests, "if publicity is a major motivating factor
for [some forms of] terrorism, will news suppression have a substantial
preventive effect [or will] it not as likely ...provoke even more visible forms
of terrorism which cannot be ignored, such as more frequent bombings of
public places," and so forth? 23 There is also the danger that controls of the
media will become points of contention between the government and ter-
rorists and might well place the government in an unfavorable light
domestically and abroad.
For further study by the news media Mann suggests consideration of five
competing interests and four approaches to self-restraint or meeting the needs







SZC. Mann, Personnel and Property of Transnational Corporations, LEGAL ASPECTS OF IN-
TRMA'nONAL TERRORISM (ASIL 1978), forthcoming.
321See id.
321d. See also N.Y. Times, March 15, 1977, at 34, col. 1 (editorial); N.Y. Times, May 26,
1978, at 24, col. 6 (editorial).
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a free press, (2) the need for safety and well-being of "target victims," (3) the
need to not unduly hamper law enforcement efforts, (4) the need to avoid en-
couragement of future acts of terrorism, and (5) the need to respect "the
privacy of the victims, their families and the enterprises which employ
them." 32 4 Another interrelated need is for the maintenance of human rights
to freedom of speech, criticism and publication. As Mann points out, the
safety and well-being of victims might, in any given case, seem to demand
a temporary news blackout, prevention of undue alarm or, conversely, wide
publicity of terrorist demands or threats to certain members of the public. 32 5
These seemingly rational responses might clash with other interests at stake.
Thus, there is no avoidance of the need to consider each interest at stake, the
degree to which each is at stake, and probable short and long term conse-
quences of alternative courses of action. Other considerations, for example,
might include the nature of the terrorist strategy, the types of participants in-
volved as precipitators and various kinds of targets, the objectives of terrorist
precipitators (both personal and political), the many relevant features of
geographic and temporal context, the socio-politico-economic background,
probable future developments and the various alternative ways of handling a
terrorist incident and reporting the news.
Four means of response identified by Mann are: (1) news timing, (2)
balanced coverage, (3) news tailoring, and (4) public education.32 6 Timing is
an important consideration and can be an alternative to complete censorship.
By temporarily withholding news of a kidnapping, for example, the media
may aid both the victim and the police. Balanced coverage, a much sought
but difficult to attain outcome, can be a useful counter to terrorist manipula-
tion of the media. News tailoring is a necessary ingredient of reporting and
can be utilized for a more rational serving of all preferred goals and thwar-
ting of the undesirable effects of the process of terrorism.3 2 7 With regard to
its educational role, Mann suggests that the media has a responsibility to
educate the public concerning the dangers of terrorism for society, the im-
propriety of taking innocent lives in order to propagandize demands and
grievances, the legitimate needs of law enforcement in a democratic society,
and the non-romantic aspects of the terroristic process.328 All of the above
concerns and approaches seem worthy of media attention, both in response to
particular incidents and during attempts to formulate individual guidelines or
ethical/professional considerations for the media in general.
While stressing the needs for balanced television reporting of "the emerg-
ing story which seems, for a moment, to be the more dramatic" side of a con-
StIMann, supra note 321, at -.
325 1d.
32'1d. at
3t7See id., listing some examples of balanced coverage, tailoring and timing and also citing
points made at a seminar of the International Press Institute, reported by the Christian Science
Monitor, May 18, 1976, at 16.3S1Id.
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troversy, avoidance of the "propagandizing of terrorism" as such, and
avoidance of the pretense of role purity (under a "Masquerade as news pure
and simple"), H.H.A. Cooper has written that the media must remain free
but address the problem of media effects with "a sense of proportion" and a
sense of professional responsiblity. 32" Professionalism, writes Cooper, includes
roles for investigative reporting, social analysis and commentary as well as at-
tempts at objective reporting; but of primary concern is an awareness of "the
problem" and maintenance of a "sense of [professional] identity.""30 With
regard to dangers posed by "suppression" of news, he writes:
suppression of the event, which could hardly be attained in its entirety, might
well, through partial revelations, halftruths, and frightening speculations, be
a greater mischief. Confidence in the media would certainly be lost and
authority itself called into question. The terrorist would have succeeed, in-
cidently, in causing that very crisis of credibility that is an important secon-
dary objective of his war on society.3 s1
Recommendations of the Author
As the reader can discern, I agree with the recommended alternatives to
media control outlined above. In particular, it seems useful to stress the need
for various news media to become more fully aware of the problems posed by
certain forms of terrorism and certain types of media response. Just as it is
too simplistic to speak of one form of terrorism (or to state that all forms
have an objective to make war on society) it is too simplistic to speak of one
form of media and one type of media response. The variations are nearly
limitless. Nevertheless it seems useful to speak of a media responsibility, not
in a legalistic sense but in a professional sense. As further investigation
discloses problems and approaches to solutions, the news media should con-
sider the formulation of professional guidelines for coverage of events, repor-
ting, commentary and educative roles.
In any event, greater attention should be paid by the media and others to
the possible relationship between terrorist strategies to produce intense fear or
anxiety and the role, responses and potential contributions of the media in
obviating terror effects and promoting, in a more positive way, the fun-
damental human rights of all members of our society. Although relevant data
is scarce and must be supplemented for more rational, realistic, policy-serving
32"See Cooper, Terrorism and the Media in TERRORISM: INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES
142, 146 and 148-54 (Y. Alexander & S. Finger eds., 1977). A contrary opinion was expressed at
the conference during which papers printed in this book were presented. See id. at 153 (media
has no educational role), and B. Johnpoll, Terrorism and the Mass Media in the United States,
id. at 159-60: "It is Useless to discuss what the media can do ... their sole role in modem socie-
ty is to transmit information." The latter approach, as Cooper points out, is both unrealistic and
unhelpful. See also Paust, supra note 15, at 86-87, 94-96, 98; E. Epstein, The Uses of "Ter-
rorism". A Study in Media Bias, id. at 67-78.




choice, the news media might begin to consider individual and/or media-
wide ethical or professional standards which address at least two general and
interrelated problems: (1) the possible need for a temporary withholding of
publication of: (a) certain kidnapping or extortion threats or incidents, (b)
certain police tactical information, and (c) bloody or terror-serving aspects of
an incident which add merely to the sensationalizing of a news story; and (2)
the need for balanced coverage of events with regard to background and the
threats of terrorism to society, democratic values and fundamental human
rights.
With regard to media awareness of problems, it would seem desirable for
media, law enforcement and government persons to exchange information
about perceived problems, interests and legal policies at stake, trends in ap-
proaches to solutions, and possible alternative measures. In this way perhaps
news media and law enforcement persons can better understand for example,
the special problems posed by a terrorist-hostage situation and can begin to
articulate mutually satisfactory professional approaches to such a problem.
On the one hand, some police officials may desire an overly broad news
blackout until suspects are in custody. Such an approach might only weaken
the negotiator's position, however, as terrorists demand coverage of some sort,
and as members of the public become more terrified by what they do not
know as opposed to what they might learn from tailored news coverage. In
fact, certain forms of news coverage can convince terrorists of the general
unacceptability of their strategy and aid in the saving of lives and well-being
of hostages."32 Certain types of coverage may also lessen tensions and aid the
negotiating process.
On the other hand, certain news persons might demand the publication
of facts that are hardly necessary for adequate coverage but thwart the efforts
of law enforcement persons to lawfully protect the lives of hostages. For ex-
ample, there seems no reason for disclosure of the details of police tactics or
the actual locations of various police during attempts to surround terrorists
and hostages, to negotiate and/or to free the hostages. Such disclosures might
not only threaten the victim-hostages but also future lives and well-being in
the case of other hostage incidents. If the reader is doubtful whether such
would ever be a problem, one need only be reminded of the hostage incident
in Washington, D.C. last year. 3 "3 During that incident a television station
showed and commented upon actual locations of police teams attempting to
get into position as well as the location of other persons trapped in one of the
buildings controlled by the terrorists but not yet taken hostage. Moreover, the
temporary withholding of news may meet the needs of the public, the media
and the police in any given situation. During the Kiritsis hostage incident in
35tSee note 16 supra.
335See, e.g., N.Y. Times, March 11, 1977, at 1, col. 3; id., March 10, 1977, at 1, col. 6
(Hanafi Moslems take hundreds hostage and wound eleven people).
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Indianapolis last year, s4 one television station delayed on the scene broadcast
for a few moments. Thus the television station could maintain control of news
content and avoid a terror-serving, gory sensationalized effect had Kiritsis
blown the head off his hostage while the cameras were rolling. If a head had
been blown off there was no need for television stations to present such a
spectacle, in full color, in the living room of each viewer.
The media is not powerless in the face of terrorists any more than in the
face of governmental officials who seek to control events for their own power
or wealth purposes. Moreover, the media need not merely report the terrorist
event. As mentioned, the media, through timing, tailoring, balanced
coverage and broader educative or enlightenment approaches can dissipate or
channel the violent effects and fear-ridden message of terrorist events. Addi-
tionally, the media can play an effective role in formulating and implemen-
ting broad educational strategies against impermissible terrorism per se, in
particular by counterposing terrorist strategy through promotion of fun-
damental human rights and efforts to prevent the human indignity and
deprivation that occurs with use of impermissible forms of terrorist
strategy.316 But all of these efforts, as well as all of the suggestions above,
must come freely from a concerned, responsible media-a professional media
that works cooperatively with educators, police, governmental officials and
others but nevertheless avoids private and governmental control.
The only possibility of restraint that I can foresee in this society, within
the limits of a democratic governmental process and a free press, is a tem-
porarily imposed judicial ban on certain media coverage in cases of extreme,
demonstrated necessity for the protection of lives and well-being. Such a
restraint, a temporary restraining order (TRO), might be permissible under
such circumstances since the judiciary-not merely the executive-would
weigh the interests and legal policies at stake in accordance with actual fact.
But TROs should be used sparingly, perhaps only against a news medium
that has demonstrated unprofessional conduct and not against all forms of
media.
Like Jefferson, we should be ever mindful of the threats posed to
democracy from our own government and the misuse of power. If anyone had
doubts about the need for free media after Nixon, Agnew, Mitchell et al, the
survey of recent trends in repression throughout much of the world should
have convinced even the snarling critics of "irresponsible" journalism that ex-
ecutive controls are far worse. Governmental interests must not outweigh the
interests of a free people in the widest shaping and sharing of
enlightenment."36 As Thomas Paine expressed so well, the public has a right,
ss
4See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Feb. 10, 1977, at 18, col. 3.
315Concerning prevention, deterrence, reconstruction and other roles, see also Paust, supra
note 15.53 6See also id.; New York Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 719 (1971) (Black, J.). Con-
cerning the necessity of serving the interests and will of the people, if need be, over the interests
of government, see Paust, supra note 6.
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a need to know: "In the representative system the reason for everything must
publicly appear. Every man is a proprietor in government, and considers it a
necessary part of his business to understand. .. There can be no mystery."33 7
The will of the people could hardly be served through mystery or secrecy, and
there is far too much secrecy in the name of security in this country for one
to permit even more inroads on authority and democratic freedoms. 338 The
TRO, however, when used sparingly in cases of actual necessity and with full
judicial protections is but a temporary interference with the public's right and
need to know. Any governmental request for a TRO will, of course, bear "a
heavy presumption against its constitutional validity" 5 9, and will thus be im-
posed only in exceptional circumstances, for a limited duration and to the ex-
tent required to protect lives and well-being. 340
CONCLUSION
In conclusion it must be emphasized that a free press is one of our fun-
damental bulwarks against private and governmental terrorism. Our
newspapers, radio stations, television stations and other forms of media
should be free to criticize governmental illegalities, manipulations of our
criminal justice system for personal or political ends, the seizure and deten-
tion of political opponents and dissidents, and the use of terrorism by govern-
mental and private entities here and abroad. As threatening to human rights
and civil liberties as the spiraling forms of death squad warfare in Argentina
and Brazil are the governmental suppressions of free speech and association
there, in South Africa, the Soviet Union, and in South Korea, to name a few.
Probably the greatest inroads on democratic freedom in the last twenty years
or so have been the increasingly tighter controls of the media, the detention
and torture of political foes or dissidents and the spiraling increase in
political assassination carried out by governments or their supporters-all in
the name of law and order or "national" security. If the media cannot even
3
" T. PAINE, THE RIGHTS OF MAN Pt. II, at 26 (1794). See also New York Times v. United
States, 403 U.S. 713, 724 (1971) (Douglas, J., concurring) ("Secrecy in government is fundamen-
tally anti-democratic"); see also id. at 719 (Black, J. concurring); and Nebraska Press Assoc. v.
Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 587 (1976) (Brennan, J., concurring). On a related need of the public for
access to the media in order to serve public enlightenment, see Barron, Access to the Press-A
New First Amendment Right, 80 HARv. L. REv. 1641 (1967).
sssSee also, H. MARCUSE. supra note 4, at 190-93, passim, recognizing the dangers posed by
a 180 degree turnaround from open government and privacy of the individual towards socializa-
tion of the individual and secrecy of the government-all in the name of "security" and the "con-
cern of the state." For related dangers in our own society, see also McDougal, Lasswell & Chen.
supra note 4. As Justice Black would remind, secrecy at the expense of representative government
provides no real security. New York Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 719 (1971).
13 9See, e.g., Nebraska Press Assoc. v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 558-59 (1976); New York Times
v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 719 (1971); CBS, Inc. v. Young, 522 F.2d 234, 238 (6th Cir.
1975).340See, e.g., CBS v. Young, 522 F.2d 234 (6th Cir. 1975); New York Times v. United States,
403 U.S. 713 at 719 (Black), 723 (Douglas), 724-26 (Breman).
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report these incidents of illegality, much less comment upon them, then we
have traveled far along a dark road toward machine-oriented, conformist-
totalitarian thinking. Alternatively, such media control may foster increasing
social violence amid clashes of ignorant, non-discriminating ideologies and
ever expansive gaps in value positions among peoples of the world who live
interdependently with greater resource scarcities. A free media and greater
attention to human and civil rights in our eductional processes are two fun-
damental restraints that must be nurtured to grow and aid in shielding future
generations from terrorism and similar assaults upon authority and human
dignity.
In my opinion, the center can hold; but we must be tolerant of the views
of others and relatively confident. These are more than virtues. They are, to
a relative degree, essential components of democratic process. Further, as the
preamble to the United Nations Charter seems to recognize, they are relevant
to the strivings of generations before us toward human dignity and peace.
"Ye are the salt of the earth: but if the salt have lost his savour,
wherewith shall it be salted? ...Ye are the light of the world. A city that is
set on a hill cannot be hid."5 41 And so must freedom shine.
341Matthew 5:13-14.
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